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Climate science indicates that climate stabilization requires low GHG emissions. Is this 
consistent with nondecreasing human welfare?  
Our welfare or utility index emphasizes education, knowledge, and the environment. We 
construct and calibrate a multigenerational model with intertemporal links provided by education, 
physical capital, knowledge and the environment.  
We reject discounted utilitarianism and adopt, first, the Pure Sustainability Optimization (or 
Intergenerational Maximin) criterion, and, second, the Sustainable Growth Optimization criterion, 
that maximizes the utility of the first generation subject to a given future rate of growth. We apply 
these criteria to our calibrated model via a novel algorithm inspired by the turnpike property. 
  The computed paths yield levels of utility higher than the level at reference year 2000 for all 
generations. They require the doubling of the fraction of labor resources devoted to the creation of 
knowledge relative to the reference level, whereas the fractions of labor allocated to consumption 
and leisure are similar to the reference ones. On the other hand, higher growth rates require 
substantial increases in the fraction of labor devoted to education, together with moderate increases 
in the fractions of labor devoted to knowledge and the investment in physical capital.   
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 1. Introduction 
Since the late 1980’s, scientists have become increasingly concerned with the effect of the emission 
of greenhouse gases (GHGs) on global temperature. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) has now issued four reports, documenting the conjecture, expressed with increasing 
levels of confidence, that recent increases in global temperature are primarily anthropogenic in 
origin, attributable in the main, but not solely, to the burning of fossil fuels. Much has been written 
about strategies of mitigation of these emissions, and/or adaptation to the higher temperatures that 
will ensue if we extrapolate according to their present rate of growth. 
  In this article, we study the problem of intergenerational equity in a world that is constrained 
to limit GHG emissions in order to keep global temperature at an acceptably low level. We construct 
and calibrate a dynamic model involving economic and environmental variables. We eschew the 
specification of a physical model of emission-stock interactions, and consider instead a particular 
path for the environmental variables, which entails very low emissions after 2050, and realistically 
appears to be feasible given present knowledge of climate dynamics. The economic variables are 
then endogenous in our optimization program. We develop a computational algorithm based on the 
turnpike property, and compute paths of resource allocation which, in a society which consists of a 
representative agent for each generation beginning with the present one, optimizes an objective 
function that sustains growth in human welfare forever, for exogenously specified rates of growth, 
taken to include zero as one possibility.   
We show that positive rates of growth in human welfare are possible, while the first 
generation experiences a utility level higher than the reference level. For growth rates very close to 
zero, the computed paths involve investments in knowledge at noticeably higher levels than in the 
past: the fraction of labor resources devoted to the creation of knowledge must be doubled, whereas 
the fractions of labor allocated to consumption and leisure are similar to those of the reference level.  
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On the other hand, higher growth rates, while also feasible, require substantial increases in 
the fraction of labor devoted to education, together with moderate increases in the fractions of labor 
devoted to knowledge and the investment in physical capital. We test for the robustness of the model 
calibration, and find qualitatively similar results. 
We now summarize what is new about our approach, and how it contrasts with the influential 
works of William Nordhaus (2008a) and Nicholas Stern (2007). 
  The society in our model consists of an infinite set of generations, each represented by a 
single agent. The agents’ utility function, and the set of feasible paths of resource allocation, are 
specified as follows. 
•  The representative agent’s utility – welfare, or quality-of-life function – has four 
arguments: (i) consumption of a produced commodity, (ii) educated leisure time, 
which is raw leisure valued by the agent’s level of education or skill, (iii) the quality 
of the biosphere at the time the agent lives, a public good, and (iv) the level, or stock, 
of human knowledge, a public good. 
•  There are three production sectors: commodity production uses as inputs skilled labor, 
capital, accumulated human knowledge, biospheric quality, and the level of GHG 
emissions permitted.  The production of knowledge is purely labor intensive using 
only skilled labor and past knowledge (think corporate research and development, 
and university research). The education of children is purely labor intensive, using 
only the skilled labor of teachers. 
•  There are four conduits of intergenerational transmission: capital passes from one 
generation to the next, after investment and depreciation; knowledge passes in like 
manner, with depreciation; the stock of biospheric quality augmented by emissions of 
the present generation passes to the next; and adult teachers educate children who 
become skilled workers and consumers at the next date.   
•  One very important production function is not explicitly modeled: the evolution of 
biospheric quality from emissions. One might postulate a law of motion for this 
process similar to the laws of motion of capital and knowledge – that biospheric 
quality at date t+1 consists of biospheric quality at date t, partially rejuvenated by 
natural processes that absorb carbon dioxide, plus the impact of new emissions of 
GHGs. However, the scientific view on the nature of this law of motion is very much   4
in flux, and so we have elected not to imply a false precision by inserting such a law 
into our model.  In place of doing so, we simply take the path of emissions and 
concomitant atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide proposed by the IPCC AR 
4 (2007, Working Group I, The Physical Science Basis, Chapter 10) as one which, 
they conjecture, will suffice to stabilize the atmospheric concentration of carbon at 
450 ppm CO2e, and we constrain our production sector not to emit more than is 
allowed on this path. That is to say: we do not optimize over possible paths of future 
emissions, because we believe the knowledge to do so does not exist at present. 
•  Our exercise is entirely normative: we choose the path to maximize the utility of the 
first generation, subject to guaranteeing a rate of growth of utility of g for all future 
generations. We compute this path for various values of g. The path with g = 0 we 
call ‘pure sustainability optimization,’ as it sustains human welfare forever at the 
highest possible level.  The paths with g >0 we call ‘sustainable growth 
optimization’  We do not propose a rule for adjudicating among various values of g: 
but our calculations suggest that values of g of 2% per (64% per generation)  are 
more ethically attractive than the optimal path at g = 0. 
•   As our approach is purely normative, we do not propose an economic equilibrium 
model, nor do we attempt to predict what the path would be in the absence of policy 
(what is often called the business as usual path).  
•  Technological change is modeled by the presence of knowledge, accumulated 
through investment in R&D, as an input into commodity production. Thus knowledge 
can substitute for capital, labor, and emissions through the process of technological 
change. 
 
What is the output of the model which interests us?  First, we seek to understand what rates 
of growth of human welfare can be sustained, given the constraints on emissions recommended by 
the IPCC. Second, we wish to understand the trade-offs implied by choosing to grow at higher rates:  
for instance, it turns out to be feasible to support welfare growth of 64% per generation with our 
calibration, but the cost will be lower welfare than the first generation would enjoy under a 0% 
growth scenario. What is the magnitude of this trade-off?  Third, we wish to understand how labor 
should be allocated among its four uses for various values of g:  labor allocated to commodity   5
production, to educating children, to research and knowledge production, and to leisure.  Should we 
radically re-allocate labor from its present uses?   
  We now contrast our approach those of with Nordhaus (2008a) and Stern (2007). 
•  Nordhaus (2008a) also carries out a normative exercise of maximizing an 
intergenerational social welfare function. He does not fix a path of emissions. Instead, 
he proposes a law of motion of biospheric degradation, and optimizes over not only 
the paths of consumption, investment, and capital, but also of emissions. As we note 
in Section 5.2 below, his solution paths entail, for the next two centuries, emission 
levels substantially higher than the IPCC-inspired paths that we adopt. 
•   The utility function of his representative agents consists only of consumption of a 
produced commodity. Accordingly, emissions and biospheric quality affect human 
welfare only indirectly, through their impact on production. 
•  Nordhaus proposes an exogenous path of technological change.  There is no 
knowledge-production sector in his model.  Neither is there an education sector in 
Nordhaus (2008a). 
•  Most importantly, the social welfare function in Nordhaus (2008a) is discounted 
utilitarian. He maximizes the discounted sum of generational utility levels, where the 
discount rate is calibrated from the rate of time impatience of existing consumers, 
calculated via the Ramsey equation. 
•  The Stern (2007) report does not carry out a full optimization exercise.  It compares 
only two paths: ‘business as usual,’ against an alternative path that cuts back severely 
on emissions. The criterion used to compare these two paths is discounted utilitarian.  
But the objective differs from Nordhaus because Stern chooses a much smaller 
discount rate (larger discount factor) than Nordhaus. Rather than calibrating the 
discount rate from the Ramsey equation – and thus from the rate of impatience of 
market consumers – Stern (2007) discounts future utility only because future 
generations might not exist, due to a small probability, at each date, of the 
disappearance of the human species.   
 
There are three principal differences between our work and that of Nordhaus and Stern.   6
(1)  Our objective is to sustain the growth of human welfare, at some specified rate of 
growth, rather than maximizing the discounted sum of generational utilities. We lack the 
space in the present paper to argue why we view our approach as superior: but we refer the 
reader to extended discussions of this matter in two accompanying papers, Llavador et al. 
(2009), and Roemer (in press). We ask the reader to note that sustaining growth is heard 
much more in both scientific and popular discussions than maximizing the sum of discounted 
utilities. While the latter has a long history in economic theory, it has little popular 
resonance. This, however, is not the main basis of our critique in the just mentioned papers. 
(2) We include four arguments in the utility function, not one. This is more realistic, we 
believe, and also provides more possibilities for substitution in order to maintain growth of 
human welfare.  While Nordhaus (2008a) claims that his ‘consumption’ can be interpreted as 
including myriad goods, this is incorrect.  For the production of different goods (leisure, 
education, knowledge) impact very differently upon biospheric quality through their 
emission of GHGs.  Nordhaus’s aggregation would be valid only if all relevant goods 
impacted upon biospheric quality in the same way. 




  Macroeconomists are used to arguing over what the discount rate should be: indeed, this is 
the main topic of disagreement between Nordhaus and Stern (see Section 5.3 below). A discount rate 
does not appear in our model, and the reader may wonder why – are we avoiding an important issue?   
The answer is that it is possible to insert a discount rate into our model, along the lines of Stern: the 
utility of future generations can be discounted because they may not exist. This topic is treated in 
Llavador et al. (2009).  It turns out, however, that the discount rate has a very different impact on the 
outcome of optimization in our ‘sustainability of welfare growth’ approach than in the discounted-
utilitarian approach.    
Because of the difficulty of obtaining reliable global data, we have calibrated our model with 
US data only. Thus, the agents in our model must be interpreted as US residents.  However, the 
IPCC emissions paths refer to global emissions, with concomitant atmospheric concentrations of 
                                                 
2 Not even in the sense of cost minimization conditional to a given stock or mitigation path, as do Lawrence Goulder 
and Koshy Mathai (2000) or OECD (2008, Ch. 7).   7
CO2e. We must therefore propose a way to allocate emissions to the United States which conforms 
to the IPCC global emissions path that we take as our constraint.  
For each growth scenario we study, we calculate two optimal paths of resource allocation: 
the first assumes that the US continues to emit 24% of global emissions forever, and the second 
assumes that US emits only its per capita share of global emissions forever. Obviously, the first is an 
optimistic, and the second a pessimistic, path as far as the welfare of US residents is concerned. 
These paths, we believe, give upper and lower bounds, respectively, on what US residents can 
expect in the political agreement that will eventually transpire among nations to allocate rights to 
emit GHGs to countries. That is: it is unreasonable to suppose that the US will emit more than its 
present share of GHGs in the future; and even if the US is allocated permits according to a global per 
capita share rule, it is almost surely the case that trading in permits will result in the US’s emitting 
more than its per capita share (hence, the second scenario provides a lower welfare bound). We have 
limited our exercise to using US data not due to an ethical parochialism, but solely in order to be 
able to calibrate a model with some confidence. 
  The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the formal details of the model.  
Section 3 explains our strategy for calculating optimal paths.  Section 4 presents the results.  Section 
5 discusses relation to the literature in more detail, and Section 6 summarizes and concludes.  
 
2. Our approach 
2.1. The utility function 
A large segment of the literature (e. g., Nordhaus, 2008a) postulates an individual or 
generational utility function with the consumption of a single, produced good as its only argument 
(sometimes augmented by leisure time): Improvements in knowledge, education, and the 
environment are then important only in so far as they make possible the production of consumption 
goods with less labor time or capital. 
In fact, both the consumption of goods and the availability of natural capital positively affect 
human welfare. Indeed, the spectacular increase of consumption in developed economies during the 
last century has undoubtedly provided a major welfare improvement (D. G. Johnson, 2000). But, in 
our view, two other factors have also had major impacts. First are the improvements in life 
expectancy, health status and infant survival, partly due to the rise in consumption, but to a large   8
extent due to medical discoveries, and their implementation by the public health system.
3 Second is 
the improvement in literacy and, more generally, in the amount of education received by the average 
person, which has enhanced not only the productivity of labor but also utility: the contribution of 
leisure to utility increases as leisure time embodies higher levels of human capital, see Salvador 
Ortigueira (1999) and Martin Wolf (2007), as well as J. J. Heckman (1976) and Robert T. Michael 
(1972).
4 In Wolf’s words: 
“The ends people desire are, instead, what makes the means they employ 
valuable. Ends should always come above the means people use. The question in 
education is whether it, too, can be an end in itself and not merely a means to some 
other end – a better job, a more attractive mate or even, that holiest of contemporary 
grails, a more productive economy. The answer has to be yes. The search for 
understanding is as much a defining characteristic of humanity as is the search for 
beauty. It is, indeed, far more of a defining characteristic than the search for food or 
for a mate. Anybody who denies its intrinsic value also denies what makes us most 
fully human.” 
 
Our approach follows the spirit of the Human Development Index produced by the United 
Nations Development Program, which considers three dimensions, namely (a) life expectancy, (b) 
education, and (c) consumption (GDP per capita). On the other hand, as we discuss in Section 2.2 
below, the welfare or the consumption of a generation’s children is not an argument in the utility 
function. 
The first argument in the utility function is consumption.  But we emphasize other factors as 
well:  
(i) Education, which modifies the value of leisure time to the individual; 
(ii) Knowledge, in the form of society’s stock of culture and science, which directly increases 
the value of life (in addition to any indirect effects through productivity), via improvements in health 
and life expectancy, and because an understanding of how the world works and an appreciation of 
culture are intrinsic to human well-being, 
(iii) An undegraded biosphere, which is valuable to humans for its direct impact on physical 
and mental health.
5 
                                                 
3 Jim Oeppen and James Vaupel (2002, p. 1029) report that “female life expectancy in the record-holding country has 
risen for 160 years at a steady pace of almost 3 months per year.” 
4 Increases in the human capital of the parents can also improve the quality of their child-rearing services, a component 
of the parents’ “leisure.” 
5 This is captured in the Cost-Benefit literature on global warming by the computation of the so-called “noneconomic 
effects.” 
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Hence, consumption, educated leisure, the stock of human knowledge, and the quality of the 
biosphere are arguments in the utility function.  The first two arguments are private goods, and the 
last two are public goods.  
We abstract from all conflicts except for the intergenerational one and, accordingly, we 
assume a representative agent in each generation. We assume that a generation lives for 25 years, 
and we formally postulate the following utility function of Generation t, t > 1: 
   ˆ (, , , ) ()()( )( )
cl n m lnm l n m m
tt t t t t t t cxS S c x S S S
α αα α Λ≡ −

,                  
where the exponents are positive and normalized such that αc + αl  + αm + αn = 1, and where: 
 ct  = annual average consumption per capita by Generation t ; 
l
t x = annual average leisure per capita, in efficiency units, by Generation t; 
n
t S = stock of knowledge per capita, which enters Generation t’s utility function and 
production function, understood as located in the last year of life of Generation t, 
m
t S = total CO2 in the atmosphere above the equilibrium pre-industrial level, in GtC, which is 
understood as located in the last year of life of Generation t;
6 and  
ˆm S = “catastrophic” level of CO2 in the atmosphere above the pre-industrial level. 
 
2.2. Optimization programs: Sustainable utility levels and sustainable growth 
We are concerned with human sustainability, which requires maintaining human welfare, 
rather than green sustainability, which may be defined as keeping the quality of the biosphere 
constant.
7 This objective can be justified by appealing to the Maximin principle, see Roemer (1998, 
2007). It can be argued, and this is Rawls’s position when justifying the (contemporaneous) 
“difference principle,” that it is the quality of life of each person that should enter the Maximin 
calculus, rather than subjective happiness, which generally includes the satisfaction that the 
individual derives from the welfare of other people, such as her children.  
                                                 
6 The preindustrial values for the CO2 stock are taken to be 595.5 GtC or 280 ppm. To convert our 
m
t S into CO2 ppm, 
add 595.5 to 
m
t S  and multiply by 0.47. To convert a number of CO2 ppm into our 
m
t S , subtract 280 from it and multiply 
by 2.13. The presence of the stock of CO2 in the utility function captures our view that environmental deterioration is a 
public bad in consumption (as well as in production), contrary to the modeling of Nordhaus (1994, 2008a) and Nordhaus 
and Joseph Boyer (2000), where it is only a public bad in production.  
 
7 See Eric Neumayer (1999) and the articles collected in Geir Asheim (2007) for the analysis of the various notions of 
sustainability.    10
 Maximizing the utility of the worst-off generation will often require the maximization of the 
utility of the first generation subject to maintaining that utility for all future generations, so that there 
is no utility growth after the first generation.
8 Formally, the optimization program is of the following 
type. 
Pure Sustainability Optimization Program: 
 max Λ subject to  ˆ ()()( )( )
cl n m lnm m
ttt t cxS S S
αα α α − ≥  Λ,   t > 1, 
and subject to the feasibility conditions given by specific production relations, laws of motion of the 
stocks and resource constraints, and with the initial conditions given by the relevant stock values in 
the base year (2000).  
  At a solution of the Pure Sustainability Optimization Program, the path of the utility will 
typically be stationary, and it can be (at least asymptotically) supported by stationary paths in all the 
arguments of the utility function. 
  Alternatively, the planner may seek a positive rate of growth in the utility of future 
generations at the cost of reducing the utility of Generation 1. It is, however, not obvious how to 
justify sacrifices of the worst-off present generation for the sake of improving the already higher 
welfare levels of future ones.
9 
One might argue that parents want their children to have a higher quality of life than they do. 
Thus, welfare growth might be supported by all parents over the Pure Sustainability Optimization 
solution. An alternative justification for altruism towards future generations would appeal to growth 
as a public good: we may feel justifiably proud of mankind’s recent gains in, say, extraterrestrial 
travel, or average life expectancy, and wish them to continue into the far future even at a personal 
cost.
10  
Indeed, there is an asymmetry in the way we feel about contemporaneous vs. temporally 
disjoint inequality: a person in a poor country may not wish to sacrifice her utility for the sake of 
improving that of a person in a richer country, while at the same time be willing to make some 
sacrifices for the welfare of unrelated, yet-to-be born individuals who will as a consequence be richer 
than she. 
                                                 
8 But not always: see Silvestre (2002).  
9 Recall that we assume away intragenerational inequality, thereby depriving economic growth of a role in alleviating 
contemporaneous poverty. This important topic has high priority in our research agenda. 
10 See Silvestre (2007).   11
Assume that society wants to achieve a sustained rate ρ of growth in future utility: instead of 
maximizing the utility of the worst-off generation, it aims at the maximization of the utility of the 
first generation, subject to the condition that utility subsequently grows at a given rate ρ per 
generation. The optimization program then becomes: 
Sustainable Growth Optimization Program 
max Λ subject to:  ˆ ()()( )( )
cl n m lnm m
ttt t cxS S S
αα α α − ≥ (1 + ρ)
t - 1Λ, t > 1, 
for ρ > 0 given, and subject again to the feasibility and initial conditions. 
Note that the Pure Sustainability Optimization Program can be written in this form by letting 
ρ = 0. 
At a solution to this program, the utility grows at a constant rate, but it is impossible to have 
steady positive growth of all variables because of the finite capacity  ˆm S of the biosphere.  
  
2.3. Economic constraints  
Feasible paths are characterized by economic constraints and by environmental stock-flow 
relations. We adopt the following economic constraints. Recall that t = 1, 2, …. is measured in 
generations (25 years).  
  (, , ,, )
ckn m
tttt t f xSSeS  ≡  1() ()() ( ) ( )
ckn e m ckn m
tttt t t t kx S S e S c i
θθθ θθ ≥+ , t > 1,      
  with  θc > 0, θk > 0, θn > 0, θc + θk + θn = 1, θe > 0, θm < 0,   
     (Aggregate  production  function  f)  
       (1−δ
k)St−1
k + k2it ≥ St
k , t > 1,    (Law of motion of physical capital)     




n, t > 1, (Law of motion of the stock of knowledge)    
 
e
t x + 
c
t x  +
n
t x  +
l
t x  ≡  t x  , t > 1,  (Allocation of efficiency units of labor)   
  k4
e
t x 1 − >  t x , t > 1, (Education production function)           
with initial conditions   000 (, , )
ekn x SS, where ct ,
l
t x , 
n
t S  and  m
t S  have been defined in Section 2.1 
above, and where: 
c
t x = average annual efficiency units of labor per capita devoted to the production of output 
by Generation t; 
et = average annual emissions of CO2 in GtC by Generation t.    12
k
t S = capital stock per capita available to Generation t; 
 it  =  average annual investment per capita by Generation t; 
n
t x  = average annual efficiency units of labor per capita devoted to the production of 
knowledge by Generation t, 
e
t x  = average annual efficiency units of labor per capita devoted to education by Generation t; 
  t x = average annual efficiency units of time (labor and leisure) per capita available to 
Generation t. 
We call emissions  t e  and concentrations 
m
t S environmental variables, whereas the remaining 
variables are called economic.  
The following remarks compare our technology to some of those postulated in the growth 
literature. 
Remark 1. The labor input in production, 
c
t x ,  is measured in efficiency units of labor, which 
may be viewed as the number of labor-time units (“hours”) multiplied by the amount of human 
capital embodied in one labor-time unit (as is customary since Hirofumi Uzawa, 1965 and Robert 
Lucas, 1988). Hence, because we assume that θc + θk + θn = 1, our production function displays 
decreasing returns to “capital” when construed to consist of physical and human capital. But returns 
would be constant if we broadened the notion of “capital” to include also the stock of knowledge. 
Remark 2. We assume that the production of new knowledge requires only efficiency labor 
(dedicated to R&D, or to “learning by not doing”), but that knowledge depreciates at a positive rate.  
These assumptions are in line with a large segment of the growth literature.   
Remark 3. Our education production function,  t x = k4
e
t x 1 −  , states that the education of a 
young generation requires only efficiency labor of the previous generation. If we normalize to unity 
the total labor-leisure time available to Generation t, then  t x can be interpreted as the amount of  
human capital per time unit in Generation t. Because our model is generational (t is a generation), 
instead of being an infinitely lived consumer (for whom t is just a moment in her life), our education 
production function cannot be interpreted in exactly the same manner as in many existing models of 
investment in human capital, which, in addition, are often cast in continuous time. More specifically, 
our formulation displays the following features.   13
(a) As in Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988), we do not include physical capital as an input in 
the production of education.  This contrasts with Sergio Rebelo (1991) and Robert Barro and Xavier 
Sala-i-Martin (1999, p. 179). In the notation and wording of Barro and Sala-i-Martin, their “human 
capital production function” is,   
 
1 [(1 ) ] [(1 ) ] HB v K u H H
η− η =− − − δ  ,     (1) 
where H is the amount of human capital, (1 - v) K is the amount of physical capital used in education, 
(1 - u) is the fraction of human capital used in education, and B, η, and δ are parameters, the last one 
being the human-capital depreciation factor. 
  (b) We interpret the labor input in the production of education as that of teachers, rather than 
students. This departs from the interpretations by Lucas (1988) and Rebelo (1991), but it agrees with 
the comments in Uzawa (1965) and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1999), e. g., the latter write (p. 179) 
“… a key aspect of education [is that] it relies heavily on educated people as an input.” 
  (c) We see the education of a generation as a social investment, in line with Lucas’s (1988, p. 
19) dictum “…a general fact that I will emphasize again and again: that human capital accumulation 
is a social activity, involving groups of people, in a way that has no counterpart in the accumulation 
of physical capital.” Also, we adopt a broad view of educational achievement, which in particular 
bestows the ability to adapt to new technologies, as emphasized by Claudia Goldin and Lawrence 
Katz (2008).  
  (d) Our education production function can be viewed as a generational version of (1) for the 
parameter values η = 0 and δ = 1 (since, in our model, all adults die at the end of each date), 
obtaining:   
11 1 [(1 ) ] tt t t HH B u H H −− − −=− −, i. e.,  1 [(1 ) ] tt HB u H − = −    , 












−↔  and  4 B k ↔ . 
2.4. Environmental stocks and flows 
Anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions have caused atmospheric concentrations 
with no precedents in the last half a million years (see, e. g., Pierre Friedlingstein and Susan 
Salomon, 2005). The unparalleled behavior of GHG concentrations has motivated a growing   14
literature that tries to predict the relationship among the paths of emissions, concentrations and 
global temperature changes.  
Following a large segment of literature, we focus on CO2 emissions and concentrations.
11 
Recent climate research has revised upwards the persistence of the effects of GHG emissions. 
Haaron Kheshgi, Steven Smith and James Edmonds (2005, p. 213) emphasize that emitted CO2 “is 
not destroyed in the atmosphere, but redistributed amongst the reservoirs that actively exchange 
carbon: plants and soils, oceans and the atmosphere.” They argue that “for CO2 to approach a 
constant concentration over finite time, CO2 emissions must peak and then gradually approach 
zero over 1,000+ years, regardless of the concentration level.” Alvaro Montenegro et al. (2007, 
p.1) argue that “higher levels of atmospheric CO2 remain in the atmosphere than predicted by 
previous experiments, and the average perturbation lifetime of emissions is much longer than the 
300-400 years proposed by other studies.” Based on new evidence on the behavior of ocean 
temperatures after increases in emissions, H. Damon Matthews and Ken Caldeira (2008) show that 
temperatures will be rising long after the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere has been stabilized 
and that in order “to achieve atmospheric carbon dioxide levels that lead to climate stabilization, 
the net addition of CO2 to the atmosphere from human activities must be decreased to nearly zero.” 
Similar conclusions are reached by Friedlingstein and Solomon (2005).  
Most of the more recent and detailed physical models have no steady states, in the strict 
sense, with positive emissions. But if emissions are steady at low enough levels, then the stock of 
GHG eventually grows very slowly, experiencing minor increases in a scale of thousands of years. 
The effects of climate change on human welfare can then be substantially attenuated via mitigation 
(e. g., the construction of levees) and adaptation (e. g., moving North). The stocks of GHG are then 
said to be “stabilized” even though, strictly speaking, they are not constant in the very long run. 
Here we assume a constant “long term” value of the stock of GHG, where “constant” is a 
simplification of “stabilized,” and where the “long term” scale refers to a few hundreds, but not 
thousands, of years.  
 
2.5. Our postulated paths for the CO2 emissions and stocks 
Because of the complexity of the climate models proposed and the lack of a canonical 
physical model of the current state of climatology, we shun false precision and do not attempt to 
                                                 
11 The long-term effects of non-CO2 GHG emissions have been addressed by Marcus Sarofim et al. (2005).   15




tt t eS . Accordingly, we do not try to compute 
optimal paths for emissions and the environmental stock. Instead, we adopt a simple path inspired by 
Meehl et al. (2007, Section 10.4), in particular by emission paths that lead to relatively low levels of 
stabilized concentrations of CO2 under the assumption of coupling between climate change and the 
carbon cycle.
12 We choose the target stabilization level of 450 ppm (Meehl et al., 2007, Section 10.4, 
Figure 10.21(a)) and, conservatively, the path of coupled emissions for the Hadley model, as in C. D. 
Jones et al. (2006, Figure 10.21.(c)).  
These paths involve increasing emissions in the near future, and drastically reduced 
emissions in the more distant future. We adopt this general pattern, but we simplify the path by 
postulating only three levels of emissions and stock, which average over each generation the 
abovementioned lifetime paths for emissions, while taking as stock values those dated at the end of 
the life of the generation. Hence, the Meehl et al. (2007) analysis justifies the feasibility of our paths 
given the initial values  2000 2000 ( , ) (6.58,177.1)
Wm eS = at year 2000 (World Resources Institute, 2009), 
where 
W e stands for annual world emission in GtC.
13 Our postulated (emission, atmospheric stock) 
pairs are: 
  11 ( , ) (6.97,303)
Wm eS=  for Generation 1, 
  22 ( , ) (4.43,354)
Wm eS=  for Generation 2, 
and  
** ( , ) ( , ) (0.4,363)
Wm W m
tt eS e S == for Generation t, t > 3, 
see Figure 2 in Section 6.1 below for a graphical representation. See also the first and last columns of 




                                                 
12 The growth of the atmospheric CO2 induces a climate change that affects the carbon cycle. In their words (p. 789) 
“There is an unanimous agreement among the models that future climate change will reduce the efficiency of the land 
and ocean carbon cycle to absorb anthropogenic CO2, essentially owing to a reduction in the land carbon uptake.”   
13 We take  2000
m S = 177.1 GtC (or 83 ppm) as the year 2000 atmospheric CO2 concentration above pre-industrial level 
(of approximately 595.5GtC in 1850) from the CAIT Indicator Framework Paper (World Resources Institute, WRI, 
2009). Total annual world emissions from energy (fossil fuels and cement) are 6.58 GtC. Once we include CO2 
emissions from land use change (7.62 GtCO2) and from other Kyoto gases (9.72 GtCO2e), total emissions (41.42 
GtCO2e) are consistent with the 42 GtCO2e total GHG emissions in 2000 reported in the Stern Review (page 170). 
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( ) per capita per capita
US World ee =
Stock of CO2 
in (World) 
Atmosphere 
     (GtC) 
Year 2000 
2000
W e  = 6.58                       2000 1.6
US e =   2000 177.1
m S =  
Generation 1 
1
W e = 6.97 
1
1 1.64
US e =  
2
1 0.25
US e =   1 303
m S =  
Generation 2 
2 4.43
W e =  
1
2 1.05
US e =  
2
2 0.14
US e =   2 354
m S =  
Generation t, t > 3  * W e = 0.4 
1* 0.09
US e =  
2* 0.01
US e =  
* 363
m S =  
 
Table 1. Our postulated paths for the environmental variables 
 
Our choices for  11 (,)
Wm eS,  22 (,)
Wm eS and 
** (,)
Wm eS imply that, in 2075, the concentration of 
CO2 in the atmosphere will be of 450 ppm (this corresponds to our value of  *
m S = 363 GtC in the 
atmospheric stock of CO2 beyond the preindustrial stock, see Footnote 6 above). The algorithm 
described in Section 3 below motivates our choice of a two-generation interval to reach the target 
stabilization level.  
The path that we choose entails, relative to the 1990 world emission levels, a 24% reduction 
in 2025 and a 93% reduction in 2050. For comparison, the American Clean Energy and Security Act 
HR 2454 of 2009 (US House of Representatives, Waxman-Markey Bill) aims at a 1% reduction in 
2020 and an 80% reduction in 2050.
14 The United Nations Human Development Report 2007/2008 
(Overview, p. 29) recommends, for developed countries, between a 20% and a 30% for 2020, and an 
80% for 2050. And the OECD Environmental Outlook Policy Package (OECD 2008, Ch. 20) 
actually entails an increase in world GHG emissions for 2050. 
As noted in the introduction, we have calibrated our economic model with US data due to 
the difficulty of obtaining reliable world data (see the following section for the numerical values). 
But the IPCC emissions paths refer to world emissions. We must therefore allocate emissions to 
                                                 
14 The act targets take 2005 as the reference year. From the CAIT, World Resources Institute, we take US emissions in 
2005 to be 20% higher than in 1990.    17
the United States in line with the IPCC-inspired global emissions path that we adopt. To do so, we 
consider two alternative scenarios.   
The first scenario maintains the share of US emissions at its year-2000 share. The US 
accounted for 1.6 GtC in that year, representing 24% of all energy (fuel and cement) emissions 
(World Resources Institute, 2009).
15 Hence, our Scenario 1 levels of future US emissions are given 
by the 24% of ( 1
W e ,  2
W e ,
* W e ): they are displayed in the second column in Table 1. 
The second scenario assumes that the US emits its per capita share of the global emissions 
1
W e ,  2
W e  and 
* W e . We use the United Nations projections for world population, and compute the 
emissions per capita along for  1
W e ,  2
W e  and
* W e as  2 1 ( , , ) (0.87,0.48,0.04)
Wpc W Wpc pc eee =  (in tC per 
capita).
16 Keeping the US population constant at year 2000 level (284,257 thousands), we obtain 
the Scenario 2 values of total US displayed in the third column in Table 1. 
These two scenarios represent upper and lower bounds for the welfare of the US 
representative agent: we conjecture that, even if emission permits were distributed on a per capita 
basis to the various countries, the US would end up purchasing rights permits from other countries. 
Hence, Scenario 2 provides a lower bound on the welfare of the representative US citizen.  
 
2.6. The calibration of parameters and initial values. 
As noted, we draw on US data in order to calibrate the parameters of the utility function, 
output and education production functions and the laws of motion for physical capital and 
knowledge, as well as the benchmark, year-2000 values of economic stocks and flows. Appendix 1 
below details our calibration procedures, which yield the values displayed in tables 2 and 3. The 
values in Table 2, as well as those for  2000
k S ,  2000
n S  and  2000
e x  from Table 3, will enter the 
computational algorithm described in the following section. 
   
3. Computational strategy and algorithm 
Our computational strategy is based on the Ray Optimization Theorem below, in the spirit of 
turnpike theory: see our companion paper Llavador et al. (2009) for a turnpike theorem in a simpler 
 
                                                 
15 We take the value  2000 e = 1.6 GtC as the US annual CO2 emissions from energy (fossil fuels and cement). 
16 World population for 2000 is 6,124,123 thousand persons. Projections establish a population of 8,010,509 






αc  0.32 
αl  0.65 
αn  0.02 





θc  0.67 
θk  0.28 
θn  0.06 
θm  -0.0075 
θe  0.091 
δ
k
  0.787 
δ
n  0.787 
      ˆm S   781.55 
 
Table 2. Calibrated values for functional parameters 
 
Variable Value  Units 
2000
k S   73.65   Thousands of 2000 dollars per capita. 
2000
n S   15.64   Thousands of 2000 dollars per capita. 
2000 x   1.396  1950-efficiency units per capita. 
2000
e x   0.047  1950-efficiency units per capita. 
2000
c x   0.396  1950-efficiency units per capita. 
2000
n x   0.023  1950-efficiency units per capita. 
2000
l x   0.931  1950-efficiency units per capita. 
2000 c   27.78  Thousands of 2000 dollars per capita. 
2000 i   6.83  Thousands of 2000 dollars per capita. 
2000 y   34.61  Thousands of 2000 dollars per capita. 
 
Table 3. Benchmark year-2000 magnitudes 
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model. Consider a pair 
** (, )
m eS  such that the constant sequence 
**




t eS  is an environmentally 
feasible flow-stock path, and the following optimization program. 
Program E
** [, , ]
m eS ρ . Given 
** (, , )
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with initial conditions  000 (, , )
ekn x SS. 
 Recall  that  ρ is the rate of growth of the utility per generation. It will be convenient to denote 
by g the rate of growth of the economic variables, again per generation. 
Theorem 1: Ray Optimization Theorem. Assume constant returns to scale in production in 
the sense that θc + θk + θn = 1.   Given (g, e*,
* m S ) 4 ˆ [0, 1) (0, )
m kS ++ ∈− × ℜ × , there is a ray  
Γ(g, e*,
* m S ) ≡
3* * {( , , ) :( , ) ( ( , , ), ( ))}
ekn kn ek m n x SS SS xqg eS qg + ∈ℜ = , such that if 
**
000 (, , ) ( ,, )
ekn m x SS g eS ∈Γ ,  000 (, , )0
ekn xSS ≠ , then the solution path to Program E
** [, , ]
m eS ρ  satisfies: 
(i)  000 (, , )( 1 ) (, , )
ekn tekn
ttt x SS g xSS =+ , t > 1, and hence 
** (, , ) ( ,, )
ekn m









() (, , ) ,









cp g q g e Sx
ip g q g e Sx
xg q g x
xg q g x







(iii) ( , , , , )
lnc
tt t t t cixx x  = 
1 (1 )
t g
− +   11 1 1 1 (,, , , )
lnc cixx x , t > 1.  
Utility grows at rate ρ, were 
m g
α − + = ρ +
1 ) 1 ( 1,   and all other variables grow at rate g, except 
for emissions and concentrations, which remain constant at 
** (, )
m eS . 
Proof. Appendix 2, where the various proportionality factors (q, p, ν) are computed in terms 
of the parameters of the model.    20
In particular, it is important to observe that, for g = ρ = 0, whenever the initial endowments 
) , , ( 0 0 0
n k e S S x  lie in 
** (0, , )
m eS Γ , the solution to Program E
** [0, , ]
m eS  is stationary over time.  
We conjecture that a turnpike theorem, analogous to the one in Llavador et al. (2009), is true 
for Program E
** [, , ]
m eS ρ  for any g, and so, if we begin with an endowment vector off the ray 
** (, , )
m ge S Γ , then the optimal solution will converge to the ray 
** (, , )
m ge S Γ . Hence, in the long run, 
the solution will be almost a steady-state path. Motivated by this conjecture, we now construct 
feasible paths which begin at the actual year-2000 endowment values  2000 2000 2000 (,,)
ekn xSS and reach the 
ray 
** (, , )
m ge S Γ  in two generations, taking as given the values 11 (,)
USj m eS ,  22 (,)
USj m eS  and 
** (,)
USj m eS, 
j = 1, 2, reported in Table 1.
17 
More precisely, for various rates of growth ρ > 0 of the utility (or associated rates of growth g 




t of utility growth 
experienced by the later generations  2 t ≥  is 1 + ρ,  and analyze the implications of these sustained 
growth factors for the utility Λ1 of Generation 1. A reference level of utility is the one determined by 
the year-2000 values of the relevant variables, to be denoted Λ0.  
We proceed in two steps. First, we solve the optimization problem for (endogenous) initial 
conditions guaranteeing that the optimal solution is a steady state (i. e., all economic variables, not 
including the environmental ones, grow at the same, predetermined rate.) Second, we go from the 
historical initial conditions to the steady state path in two generations, while keeping the rate of 
growth of the utility for all generations after the first one at the predetermined rate.  
The utility of Generation t is given by  ˆ ()( )( )
α αα α −
cl n m lnm m
tt t t cx S SS . If all variables (except 
biospheric quality) grow at a rate g, then the utility will grow at rate ρ where 
m g
α − + = ρ +
1 ) 1 ( 1 .   A 
balanced growth solution relative to our choice requires three growth rates:  
                                                 
17 Inspired by IPCC AR4 (2007), we have computed paths in which carbon concentrations converge to the stabilized 
level in two generations. However, our optimization program could be run for slower convergence paths, with 
convergence in three or more generations, at the cost of additional complexity in computation. We have also tried to 
maximize the utility of Generation 1 subject to its reaching the ray. Note that Generation 1’s investment in knowledge 
(which affects the utility of Generation 1 both directly and indirectly through production) and Generation 1’s investment 
in physical capital (which affects the utility of Generation 1 only indirectly through production) create intergenerational 
public goods. It turns out that, even for a zero-growth target, when Generation 1 maximizes its own utility subject to the 
stock proportionality dictated by the ray, it invests so heavily as to make the utility of the future generations higher that 
its own, a feature formally similar to the one discussed in Silvestre (2002). The resulting path yields therefore an 
unnecessarily low value. It is for this reason that we choose Generation 2 as the first one that has stocks on the ray.   21
g for the variables (,,,,)
nnecl Sxxxx,  
γ for the variables i, c and 
k S ,  
ρ for the utility.   
But ρ and γ are functions of g: so there is one independently chosen growth rate. For θc + θk + 
θn = 1, we have that g = γ.  
We apply the following two-step algorithm for the chosen 
**
11 22 (, , , , , , )
mmm eS eS eS ρ . 
Step 1.  For an arbitrary 2
e x , solve the following program.  
   Program  2 []
e Gx .  G iven 
**
11 22 (, , , , , , )
mmm eS eS eS ρ  and  2
e x  ,  Max Λ1 subject to 
   11 1 1 ˆ ()( )( )
cl n m lnm m cx S SS
αα α α − > Λ1, 
   22 2 2 ˆ ()()( )
cl n m lnm m cx S SS
ααα α − > (1 + ρ)Λ1, 
  
**
222 (, , ) ( ,, )
ekn m x SS g eS ∈Γ , 
11 1 1 1 1 1 1
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for the initial conditions  0 0 0 2000 2000 2000 (, , )( , , )
ekn e k n xSS x S S = as given in Table 3.  
 Step  2.   Note that the utility of Generation 3, and of all subsequent generations, is determined 
by  2
e x  . By trial and error, we locate the value of  2
e x  with the property that, at the solution to Program 
2 []
e Gx , the utility of Generation 3 equals (1 + ρ)
2Λ1. Note that then the utility of Generation t, t > 4, 
is (1 + ρ)
t-3
 times the utility of Generation 3 (by Theorem 1), and that, by the second constraint of 
Program  2 []
e Gx , the utility of Generation 2 is (1 + ρ)Λ1. Hence, the utility of Generation t is 
1
1 (1 )
t− +ρ Λ , for all t > 1.    22
  Appendix 3 writes the solution to Program  2 []
e Gx as a system of 14 equations in the 14 
endogenous variables  111 1 1 1 2 2 2 21 2 1 1 (, ,,,,,,,,, , ,,)
lcne lcn kn cxxxxcxxxiiS S Λ , which is then reduced to a 
system of seven equations in seven unknowns. Then, using Mathematica, we compute the numerical 
solution paths to Program  2 []
e Gx for our calibrated parameter values, and adjust  2
e x  so that the utility 
of Generation 3 equals (1 + ρ)
2Λ1, implying, as noted above, that the utility of Generation t is 
(1 + ρ)
t-1Λ1, for all t > 1. We perform this calculation for three sustained growth rates of the utility, 
namely  ˆ 0.00 ρ= (no growth),  ˆ 0.01 ρ=  and  ˆ 0.02 ρ = , where  ˆ ρ is the rate of growth of the utility 
expressed in per annum terms, with corresponding rates of growth per generation (defined by 
25 ˆ (1 ) ρ= +ρ ) equal to  0.00 ρ= , 0.28 ρ= and 0.64 ρ = , respectively. 
 
4. Results 
Tables 4-6 describe the obtained paths of utility and of the economic variables in the two scenarios 
for US emissions. The first rows in the tables display the year-2000 values (see Table 3 above) 
repeated in each table to facilitate comparison. Some of the information in these tables is 
summarized in Table 7 and depicted in Figure 1. Recall (see Section 2.5 above) that we postulate a 
rather conservative path of total GHG emissions aimed at stabilizing GHG concentrations at 450 
ppm, and consider two scenarios: Scenario 1( ) 0.24
US World e e =× , in which the US is responsible for 
24% of all emissions (its share of total emissions in 2000); and Scenario 2 () per capita per capita
US World ee = , in 
which total emissions are allocated on a per capita basis. 
  Our computations yield the following results.  
 Result  1. Utility can be sustained forever at a level substantially higher than the year-2000 
reference level (26% higher in Scenario 1, or 17% higher in Scenario 2). 
  See the first column (of the top half) of Table 4. The utility of the first generation jumps to 
25.82% (resp. 16.87%) above that of the year-2000 reference level in the first (resp. second) scenario 
on US emissions, and stays there forever. This fact is illustrated by the two horizontal lines in both 
graphs in Figure 1: the lower, dotted line, with ordinate equal to 1, corresponds to the year-2000 
reference level, while the continuous horizontal line with circular dots gives the sustained level of 
utility for all generations t > 1. As expected, the lower US emissions of Scenario 2 yield smaller 























  t i  
k
t S  
n
t S  
Gen  Scenario 1 ( ) 0.24
US World e e =×  
2000  1.00 1.00  27.78  1  -  6.83  73.65  15.64 
1  1.2582 1.2582  41.0709  1.4784  1.4784 14.46 205.32  48.93 
2  1.2582 1.0000  38.2724  1.3777  0.9319 7.76  145.55  54.84 
3  1.2582 1.0000  30.6556  1.1035  0.8010 8.73  145.55  54.84 
4 1.2582  1.0000  30.6556  1.1035 1.0000 8.73  145.55  54.84 
Gen  Scenario 2 ( ) per capita per capita
US World ee =  
2000  1.00 1.00  27.78  1  -  6.83  73.65  15.64 
1 1.1687  1.1687  32.4637  1.1686 1.1686 11.08 161.03  48.82 
2 1.1687  1.0000  29.8476  1.0744 0.9194 5.94  112.23  55.61 
3 1.1687  1.0000  23.6389  0.8509 0.7920 6.73  112.23  55.61 
4 1.1687  1.0000  23.6389  0.8509 1.0000 6.73  112.23  55.61 
 
  t x  
e
t x  
c
t x  
n
t x  
l
t x  
e
t x  (%)
c
t x (%) 
n
t x (%) 
l
t x  (%) 
Gen  Scenario 1 ( ) 0.24
US World e e =×  
2000  1.396 0.047  0.396  0.023  0.931 0.0333  0.2833  0.0167  0.6667 
1  1.648 0.047  0.472  0.070  1.059 0.0282  0.2866  0.0426  0.6426 
2  1.650 0.052  0.434  0.068  1.095 0.0318  0.2632  0.0415  0.6635 
3  1.858 0.052  0.518  0.066  1.222 0.0282  0.2786  0.0358  0.6574 
4  1.858 0.052  0.518  0.066  1.222 0.0282  0.2786  0.0358  0.6574 
Gen  Scenario 2 ( ) per capita per capita
US World ee =  
2000  1.396 0.047  0.396  0.023  0.931 0.0333  0.2833  0.0167  0.6667 
1  1.648 0.047  0.470  0.070  1.062 0.0285  0.2850  0.0425  0.6441 
2  1.663 0.053  0.437  0.070  1.104 0.0320  0.2625  0.0419  0.6637 
3  1.884 0.053  0.525  0.067  1.239 0.0282  0.2786  0.0358  0.6574 
4  1.884 0.053  0.525  0.067  1.239 0.0282  0.2786  0.0358  0.6574 
 

























  t i  
k
t S  
n
t S  
Gen  Scenario 1 ( ) 0.24
US World e e =×  
2000  1.00 1.00  27.78  1  -  6.83  73.65  15.64 
1  1.2476 1.2476  40.7171  1.4657  1.4657 14.32 203.50  48.50 
2  1.6000 1.2824  48.8354  1.7579  1.1994 11.11 189.08  70.50 
3  2.0518 1.2824  50.3244  1.8115  1.0305 15.46 243.09  90.64 
4 2.6313  1.2824  64.7000  2.3290 1.2857 19.88 312.54  116.53 
Gen  Scenario 2 ( ) per capita per capita
US World ee =  
2000  1.00 1.00  27.78  1  -  6.83  73.65  15.64 
1  1.1588 1.1588  32.1824  1.1585  1.1585 10.97 159.58  48.39 
2  1.4860 1.2824  38.0823  1.3709  1.1833 8.52  145.79  71.49 
3  1.9057 1.2824  38.8037  1.3968  1.0189 11.92 187.44  91.91 
4  2.4440 1.2824  49.8883  1.7958  1.2857 15.33 240.99  118.16 
 
  t x  
e
t x  
c
t x  
n
t x  
l
t x  
e
t x  (%)
c
t x (%) 
n
t x (%) 
l
t x  (%) 
Gen  Scenario 1 ( ) 0.24
US World e e =×  
2000  1.396 0.047  0.396  0.023  0.931 0.0333  0.2833  0.0167  0.6667 
1  1.648 0.060  0.468  0.070  1.050 0.0366  0.2841  0.0422  0.6371 
2  2.139 0.087  0.565  0.093  1.394 0.0408  0.2640  0.0433  0.6520 
3  3.090 0.112  0.862  0.116  2.000 0.0363  0.2790  0.0377  0.6471 
4  3.973 0.144  1.109  0.150  2.571 0.0363  0.2790  0.0377  0.6471 
Gen  Scenario 2 ( ) per capita per capita
US World ee =  
2000  1.396 0.047  0.396  0.023  0.931 0.0333  0.2833  0.0167  0.6667 
1  1.648 0.061  0.466  0.069  1.053 0.0369  0.2824  0.0421  0.6386 
2  2.156 0.088  0.568  0.094  1.406 0.0410  0.2632  0.0437  0.6521 
3  3.134 0.114  0.874  0.118  2.028 0.0363  0.2790  0.0377  0.6471 
4  4.029 0.146  1.124  0.152  2.607 0.0363  0.2790  0.0377  0.6471 
 
Table 5.  ˆ 0.01 ρ=  (1% annual growth or 28% generational growth) 






















  t i  
k
t S  
n
t S  
Gen  Scenario 1 ( ) 0.24
US World e e =×  
2000  1.00 1.00  27.78  1  -  6.83  73.65  15.64 
1  1.2341 1.2341  40.2671  1.4495  1.4495 14.14 201.17  47.97 
2  2.0246 1.6406  62.0291  2.2329  1.5404 15.30 243.55  90.00 
3  3.3216 1.6406  82.0137  2.9523  1.3222 26.66 401.57  148.40 
4 5.4494  1.6406  135.2266 4.8678 1.6488 43.95 662.11  244.68 
Gen  Scenario 2 ( ) per capita per capita
US World ee =  
2000  1.00 1.00  27.78  1  -  6.83  73.65  15.64 
1 1.1461  1.1461  31.8247  1.1456 1.1456 10.83 157.73  47.85 
2 1.8803  1.6406  48.3668  1.7411 1.5198 11.75 187.78  91.26 
3 3.0849  1.6406  63.2345  2.2763 1.3074 20.55 309.62  150.47 
4 5.0611  1.6406  104.2630 3.7532 1.6488 33.89 510.51  248.10 
 
  t x  
e
t x  
c
t x  
n
t x  
l
t x  
e
t x  (%)
c
t x (%) 
n
t x (%) 
l
t x  (%) 
Gen  Scenario 1 ( ) 0.24
US World e e =×  
2000  1.396 0.047  0.396  0.023  0.931 0.0333  0.2833  0.0167  0.6667 
1  1.648 0.078  0.463  0.069  1.039 0.0472  0.2809  0.0417  0.6302 
2  2.761 0.144  0.727  0.123  1.767 0.0522  0.2632  0.0445  0.6401 
3  5.106 0.237  1.420  0.199  3.249 0.0465  0.2781  0.0390  0.6364 
4  8.419 0.392  2.342  0.328  5.358 0.0465  0.2781  0.0390  0.6364 
Gen  Scenario 2 ( ) per capita per capita
US World ee =  
2000  1.396 0.047  0.396  0.023  0.931 0.0333  0.2833  0.0167  0.6667 
1  1.648 0.079  0.460  0.069  1.041 0.0476  0.2792  0.0416  0.6316 
2  2.783 0.146  0.731  0.125  1.782 0.0525  0.2625  0.0449  0.6402 
3  5.177 0.241  1.440  0.202  3.295 0.0465  0.2781  0.0390  0.6364 
4  8.537 0.397  2.374  0.333  5.433 0.0465  0.2781  0.0390  0.6364 
 
Table 6.  ˆ 0.02 ρ=  (2% annual growth or 64% generational growth) 
 
   

















  Scenario 1 ( ) 0.24
US World e e =×  




ˆ ρ= 0.01 
ρ = 0.28 
1.248  0.0085 = 0.85% 
ˆ ρ= 0.02 
ρ = 0.64 
1.234  0.0192 = 1.92% 
  Scenario 2 ( ) per capita per capita
US World ee =  




ˆ ρ= 0.01 
ρ = 0.28 
1.159  0.0085 = 0.85% 
ˆ ρ= 0.02 
ρ = 0.64 
1.146  0.0193 = 1.93% 
 
Table 7. The utility of the first generation (first column) relative to the year-2000 reference level Λ0, 
and the sacrifice of the first generation to sustain subsequent positive growth rates (second column). 
The tildes denote the solution for the corresponding variable as a function of  ˆ ρ. 
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Utility of generations t = 1 to 5 for alternative rates ˆ ρof per annum growth in utility. 
All variables grow at a rate slightly higher than ˆ ρ, with the exception of emissions and the stock of 
the biosphere, which follow the path described in Table 1 above.  
Figure 1(a). Scenario 1 ( ) 0.24
US World e e =×  
Figure 1(b). Scenario 2 ( ) per capita per capita
US World ee =    28
 Result  2.  For the low US emissions of Scenario 2, the sustainable steady state 
consumption is lower than the year-2000 reference consumption level; the increase in utility 
stated in Result 1 is then due to the increases in the stock of knowledge and in the quality of 
leisure. 
  The fourth column (of the top half) of Table 4 shows that steady-state consumption falls to a 
85% of its year-2000 value. This decrease is more than compensated by the improvements in 
knowledge, which augments by a factor of 3.56 (see 8
th column of the top half of Figure 4), and in 
the quality of leisure, which improves by a 35% (see first column in the bottom half of Table 4: the 
fraction of time devoted to leisure in fact slightly decreases, see the 1
st, 5
th and 9
th columns of the 
bottom half of Table 4). In other words, the Pure Sustainability Optimization path requires a degree 
of sacrifice in material consumption, offset by improvements in other sources of the quality of life. 
 Result  3. Moderate growth rates can be achieved at the cost of a small reduction in the 
utility of the first generation, which stays well above the year 2000 reference level.  
A tradeoff between the utility of the first generation and the subsequent growth rates must 
indeed be expected. But our analysis shows that its magnitude is quite small: Generation 1’s sacrifice 
for the sake of a higher growth rate is tiny for reasonable growth rates. 
Table 7 (obtained from Tables 5 and 6) displays the relevant ratios. As stated in Result 1, 
utility can be sustained forever while the utility of the first generation is 1.26 (Scenario 1) and 1.17 
(Scenario 2) times the year-2000 reference level. The second and fourth rows of Table 7 show that, 
in order to subsequently maintain a 1% growth rate per year (28% per generation), the utility of the 
first generation must be about 0.85% lower than the no-growth value. In other words, a maintained 
growth rate of 28% per generation can be reached at the cost of a less than 1% reduction of the utility 
of the first generation relative to the sustainable (no growth) path. 
Similarly, the third and fifth rows of Table 7 show that, in order to subsequently maintain a 
2% utility growth rate per year (64% per generation), the utility of the first generation would be 
about 1.9% lower than the sustainable, no-growth value. In other words, a maintained growth rate of 
64 % per generation can be reached at the cost of a less than 2% reduction of the utility of the first 
generation relative to the no growth path.  
Figure 1 shows the utility paths computed under the different growth targets. Note that they 
stay well above the year-2000 reference level. It is not possible at the scale of the graph to   29
distinguish among the three values of the utility of the first generation (for annual growth rates of 0, 
1% and 2%, respectively), all clustered close to the 1.25 value. 
  How are these utility paths implemented? Labor time is, in the reference year 2000, allocated 
to the various ends as follows (see, e. g., the last four columns of Table 4, and the disaggregation of 
output into consumption and investment in columns 3 and 6 therein): 
 Fraction  allocated  to  education:       0.0333 
  Fraction allocated to the production of consumption:   0.2150 
  Fraction allocated to investment in physical capital:    0.0683 
  Fraction allocated to the creation of knowledge:     0.0167 
 Fraction  allocated  to  leisure:        0.6667 
         1.0000 
  Table 8 indicates how these fractions should be modified in the proposed solutions. We 















































































Scenario 1 ( ) 0.24
US World e e =×  
ˆ 0 ρ=  
(No growth) 
0.848 2.552  1.334  0.932  0.964 
ˆ 0.01 ρ=  
0.282 ρ=  
1.099 2.529  1.322  0.924  0.956 
ˆ 0.02 ρ=  
0.64 ρ=  
1.418 2.498  1.306  0.914  0.945 
  Scenario 2 ( ) per capita per capita
US World ee =  
ˆ 0 ρ=  
(No growth) 
0.855 2.546  1.297  0.934  0.966 
ˆ 0.01 ρ=  
0.282 ρ=  
1.108 2.522  1.284  0.926  0.958 
ˆ 0.02 ρ=  
0.64 ρ=  
1.430 2.492  1.268  0.916  0.947 
 
Table 8. Comparison between steady state and year-2000 values of the allocation of labor for the 
various growth rates. Again, the tildes denote the solution for the corresponding variable as a 
function of  ˆ ρ. 
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Result 4. The most important change required by the implementation of the proposed 
utility paths is the (more than) doubling of the reference fraction of labor devoted to the creation 
of knowledge, whereas the fractions of labor allocated to consumption and to leisure are similar to 
those of the reference year 2000. 
  The largest change displayed in Table 8 occurs in the fraction allocated to knowledge, which 
must be about twice (2.14, 2.26 or 2.34) the year-2000 reference level. The fraction of labor time 
devoted to the production of the consumption good is slightly lower. We also observe a slight 
decrease in leisure time relative to the year 2000 reference values. 
  As might be expected, higher growth rates require higher fractions of labor dedicated to the 
various forms of investment (education, knowledge and physical capital), and lower fractions 
dedicated to consumption and leisure. But as just noted, the fractions of labor dedicated to 
consumption and leisure are not very sensitive to the growth rate, whereas it turns out that the 
fraction of labor devoted to education increases rapidly with the target growth rate. Table 9, obtained 
by dividing the values in rows 2 and 3 of Table 8 by those of the first row (and subtracting 1), 
illustrates. This yields the following result. 
 Result  5.  Higher growth rates require substantial increases in the fraction of labor 
devoted to education (of the order of a 30% increase for each additional 1% of annual growth), 
together with moderate increases in the fractions of labor devoted to knowledge and the 
investment in physical capital (of the order of a 5% increase for each additional 1% of annual 
growth). Higher growth rates also require minor decreases in the amount of labor-time devoted to 
the production of consumption goods and to leisure (of the order of a 2% decrease for each 
additional 1% of annual growth).   
  We have tested for the robustness of our results in several ways. In addition to our calibrated 
values, we also considered a lower  ˆm S = 650 ppm and a higher  ˆm S =750 ppm, as well as lower and 





,θe, and θm: we have obtained qualitatively similar results. Unsurprisingly, the 
sustainable level of utility increases with the catastrophic level of carbon concentration in the 
atmosphere ( ˆm S ) and with the elasticities of output to emissions ( e θ ) and to concentration ( m θ ), and 
decreases with the relative weight of the environment in utility ( m α ).Yet our qualitative conclusions 
continue to hold under these changes.  Finally, we have also considered different values of   31
parameters associated with the educational technology ( 4 k ), and we have found that we can sustain 
forever levels of  life-quality above the 2000 reference value, even for much lower values of  4 k .




































































































Scenario 1 ( ) 0.24
US World e e =×  
ˆ 0.01 ρ=  
0.282 ρ=  
29.631 % above 
no growth 
0.928 % below 
no growth 
0.951 % below  
no growth 




ˆ 0.02 ρ=  
0.64 ρ=  
67.325% above  
no growth 
2.108 % below  
no growth 
2.160 % below  
no growth 




  Scenario 2 ( ) per capita per capita
US World ee =  
ˆ 0.01 ρ=  
0.282 ρ=  
29.633 % above 
no growth 
0.938 % below 
no growth 
0.987 % below  
no growth 




ˆ 0.02 ρ=  
0.64 ρ=  
67.329% above  
no growth 
2.131 % below  
no growth 
2.242 % below  
no growth 





Table 9. The sensitivity of the fractions of labor resources devoted to each activity with respect to 
the target growth rate.  
 
 
5. Relation to the literature 
5.1. Discounted utilitarianism 
A large fraction of the literature on climate change adopts the discounted-utilitarian 
normative criterion. But we find discounted utilitarianism ethically unacceptable, at least for the 
low pure-time discount factors typically used, which put a weight on the utility of future 
generations much lower than that of the present generation. The only ethical justification for 
putting a lower weight on the welfare of future generations in the utilitarian calculus should be 
based on a positive probability of extinction of mankind. As argued in the Stern Review, this 
rationale would perhaps support a discount rate of  ˆ δ  = 0.001 = 0.1% per annum, associated with a 
                                                 
18 For example, even for an unrealistically low value of  4 k equal to 31, utility can be sustained forever at a level 9,8% 
higher than the year 2000 reference level under scenario 1, and at a level 2% higher under Scenario 2.   32
0.905 probability of mankind’s surviving 100 years.
19 Of course, a rigorous development of this 
idea requires an explicit model of uncertainty: see Appendix 4 below and Llavador et al. (2009). 
 The low time discount factors frequent in the literature are mathematically expedient, 
because they make the sum of discounted utilities finite.
20 But only with extremely low factors this 
would be the case for the economy modeled and calibrated here, as it can be argued as follows. 
Denote by 
* ˆ[* , ]
m Pe S  the set of feasible paths according to the constraints of Program 
** [,, ]
m Ee S ρ  of Section 3 above, for some fixed endowment vector (x0
e,S0
k,S0
n).  (This set is 
independent of the value of ρ.)  The associated Discounted-Utilitarian Program, with a discount 
factor of ϕ, is: 
Program
** [, , ]




ϕΛπ π ∈ ∑
1* *
1




Pe S  ,         
where ( ) t Λπ is the utility at date t along the path π. We have: 
Corollary to Theorem 1.  Program 
** [, , ]




−α ϕ > . 
Proof.  By Theorem 1, for any g < k4 −1 there is a ray Γ(g,e
*,S
m*) such that, from any 
initial endowment vector on this ray, the balanced growth path where the economic variables grow at 
rate g is feasible.  For anyg < k4 −1, we can construct a path which, in a finite number of dates, 
moves from the given endowment vector (x0
e,S0
k,S0
n) to some point on this ray. We then complete the 
path by appending the balanced growth path just referred to. Again by Theorem 1, the utility grows 
by a factor of 1+ρ at each date, after the initial section of the path, where 
1 1( 1 )
m g
−α +ρ= + .  But g 
may be chosen so that 1+ g is arbitrarily close tok4 . Hence, the terms of the discounted-utilitarian 




−α ϕ : in particular, g can be chosen so that this 
factor is greater than one,  by the premise, which proves the corollary.  
                                                 







. Hence, a discount rate of 0.1% yields a discount factor 
of 0.999001 per annum. See sections 5.2 and 5.3 below for the discussion of other discount factors used in the 
literature.  
20 See Llavador et al. (2009) for a discussion of how a discounted utilitarian would choose paths when the discounted-
utilitarian program diverges, 
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  If we take 1− p = 0.975  per generation of 25 years, as does the Stern Review, then the 
discounted utilitarian program will diverge as long as 
1
4 (1 ) 1
m pk
−α − > .  But this inequality surely 
holds with our calibration of the parameters. 
It is notable that the ‘power’ of the technology, in the sense of whether or not Program 
** [, , ]
m DU e S ϕ diverges, depends only on the technological parameterk4 , associated with the 
educational technology, not on any parameters associated with the other two production functions. 
In a simpler model than the one here, studied in Llavador et al. (2009), we attempt to explain in an 
intuitive way why this is the case, and we shall not repeat that argument here.  The fact depends 
upon the constant-returns technology, that labor is the single input in the production of skilled 
labor, and upon the constant-returns utility function. In particular, the last fact requires that leisure 
be measured in quality units, an assumption we strongly defend. As long as the assumption that the 
educational technology uses only educated labor as an input is approximately true, we believe this 
result is robust. We are reminded of Goldin and Katz (2008), who argue that the power of the 
American growth performance in the twentieth century was fundamentally due to universal 
education.  
 
5.2. Nordhaus’s optimization 
Nordhaus (2008a,b) proposes particular paths for CO2 emissions, CO2 concentrations and 








tt t t Lc
−η
= −η+ δ ∑   ,  (2) 
where Lt is the number of people in generation t.
21 He calls the δ and η of (2) “central” and 
“unobserved normative parameters,” reflecting “the relative importance of the different generations.” 
(Nordhaus 2008a, p. 33, 60).
22 Note that the Pure Sustainability Optimization objective function of 
our Section 2.2 above could be viewed as a limit case of (2) for Lt  = 1, δ = 0 and η → ∞. Nordhaus 
                                                 
21 The objective function is given in Nordhaus (2008a, p. 205), with each period t = 1, 2,.... understood as a decade 
(instead of our 25-year generations). His notation is different. The optimization is numerically solved by the General 
Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS) program, see Nordhaus (2008b).  
22 The parameter η could also be interpreted, following the classical utilitarians and the discounted utilitarian approach 
discussed in the previous section, as an index of the concavity of a common, cardinal and interpersonally unit-
comparable utility function displaying decreasing marginal utility, see Roemer (1998) for definitions. But Nordhaus 
(2008a,b) does not adopt this interpretation.  
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(2008a) chooses η = 2 and δ = 
10 (0.015) , corresponding to a per year rate of  ˆ 0.015 δ= .
23 Appendix 5 
below comments on Nordhaus’s (2008a) objective function and on his calibration of its parameters.  
   The paths for emissions and concentrations proposed as optimal by Nordhaus differ markedly 
from the ones that we postulate: figures 2(a) (emissions) and 2(b) (concentrations) illustrate. Recall 
that we take as given a conservative path that drops emissions to very low levels by 2050 and 
stabilizes atmospheric CO2 concentration at about 450 ppm by 2050. In striking contrast, Nordhaus 
(2008a, b) proposes as “optimal” a path where emissions and concentrations keep increasing past the 
end of the 21
st century. Nordhaus (2008a, b) proposed values for 2100 are about 11 GtC in 
emissions, with concentrations at 586.4 ppm at 2100 and at a peak of about 680 ppm in 2180.  
In light of the recent climate science research, we view Nordhaus’s (2008a, b) “optimal” 
emission and concentration figures as excessively high, likely to bring about irreversible changes in 
temperature and unavoidable negative impacts in the welfare of future generations.  
A striking feature of Nordhaus (2008a) is that the path for per capita consumption (his only 
variable in the individual utility function) is virtually identical (at least for the 21
st century) in the 
“optimal” and in the “baseline” (laissez faire) paths, see his Figure 5.9. Yet he claims (p. 82) that the 
value of the objective function at the “optimal” solution is 3.37 trillions of 2005 US$ higher than at 
the baseline solution.  We conjecture that this puzzle may be partially explained by population 
growth, which increases the value of the objective function for a given level of consumption per 
capita, together with minute differences in consumption per capita. Because of the little difference 
between the optimal and nonoptimal paths of consumption per capita, we conjecture that his rate of 
growth in consumption per capita is basically driven by his postulated exogenous growth in total 
factor productivity.  
 
5.3. Cost-Benefit analysis: The Stern Review 
Cost-Benefit analysis underpins the recommendations of the Stern Review, in turn based on 
the Third Assessment Report of the United Nation’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(TAR IPCC, 2001) and on Christopher Hope (2006). The Stern Review does not attempt to solve an 
optimization program: it is rather a cost-benefit analysis arguing that the “costs of inaction are larger 
than costs of action.” Assuming a path of growth for the GDP, and starting from a Business as Usual 
(laissez-faire) hypothesis on the path of GHG emissions, it considers alternative policies that reduce 
                                                 
23 The latter is half the value adopted in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), see Nordhaus (2008a, p. 50).   35
emissions in the present, and eventually stabilize GHG in the atmosphere. The review argues that, 
properly discounted, the benefits of strong, early action on climate change outweigh the costs. 
It should be noted that discount rates have different roles in Cost-Benefit Analysis and in discounted-
utilitarianism optimization. Discounted utilitarianism (see Section 5.1) uses the pure time discount 
rate δ to weight the utilities of the various generations in the utilitarian maximand, whereas Cost-
Benefit Analysis uses the consumption discount rate  δ + ηg   to evaluate the changes in future 
consumption streams due to a particular (marginal) investment project, relative to a reference 
consumption path that exogenously grows at a rate g  .  The project passes the Cost Benefit test if the 
discounted sum of the consumption streams is positive. As noted above, the Stern Review uses a 
pure time discount rate of  ˆ δ  = 0.001 (based on the survival justification), together with  η = 1 and g   
=  013 . 0 =
c
c   (1.3 % per annum), yielding a consumption discount rate of 0.014. Its commentators 
suggest higher consumption discount rates (Arrow, 2007, Nordhaus, 2007, Martin Weitzman, 2007: 
see the debate in the Postscripts to the Stern Review available at www.sternreview.org.uk, as well as 
the issue of World Economics 7(4), October-December 2006, and the subsequent Simon Dietz et al., 
2007).
24   
Because the Stern Review does not solve an optimization program, its recommendations are 
in principle open to the objection, voiced by the critics of the Review, that the consumption discount 
rate should reflect the rates of return of the available investment alternatives: even if, using a 
consumption discount rate of 0.014, carbon emission reductions pass the Cost-Benefit test, future 
generations could conceivably be better off if the current generation avoided incurring the costs of 
GHG reductions and invested instead in other intergenerational public goods. In defense of the 
Review, Dietz et al. (2007, p. 137) argue that “it is hard to know why we should be confident that 
social rates of return would be, say, 3% or 4% into the future. In particular, if there are strong climate 
                                                 
24 Nordhaus discounts the utility of future generations by the time-rate of discount that he deduces for today’s market 
consumer, from the Ramsey equation, which he takes to be  .015 δ = per annum.   This leads to a discount factor 
applied to the utility of those alive a century from now of 
100 100 11




.   Stern discounts the 
utility of those a century from now (who may not exist) according to the probability of extinction of the human 
species; he applies a discount factor of 
44 (1 ) (.975) 0.904 p −= = .   If we adopt Stern’s probability-of-extinction, 
we do not discount the utility (utility) of those a century from now at all: that is, our discount factor applied to the 



























































































Figure 2.  
Comparison of paths for the environmental variables proposed by Nordhaus (2008a,b) with the 
ones postulated in the present paper. 
The paths for Nordhaus “Optimal” are computed by running the program GAMS with data provided in 
Nordhaus (2008b). The curve labeled “Optimal” of Figure 5-6 in Nordhaus (2008a) displays emissions 
only for the period 2005-2105, where they coincide with those of Figure 2(a) here (except that there the 
emissions are per decade, and here per year). Similarly, the curve labeled “Optimal” of Figure 5-7 in 
Nordhaus (2008a) displays concentrations only for the period 2005-2205, where they coincide with those 
of Figure 2(b) here. 




















































































2(a) CO2 Emissions   37
change externalities, then social rates of return on investment may be much lower than the observed 
private returns on capital over the last century, on which suggestions of a benchmark of 3% or 4% 
appear to be based.”  
As we have shown, the discounted utilitarian program with the Stern Review’s discount 
factor diverges on the set of feasible paths that we have proposed in this article.  Because the Stern 
Review only calculates discounted utility for a small number of generations, it need not address this 
issue.  This again shows the limitations of the cost-benefit method.   
Our approach is in a sense dual to Cost-Benefit analysis. The latter takes as given a path for 
the economic variables, and recommends a path for the environmental variables (based on a cost-
benefit criterion in the spirit of discounted utilitarianism). We, on the contrary, take as given a path 
for the environmental variables, and recommend paths for the economic variables (based on the 
criteria of sustainable utility and sustainable growth). 
 
6. Summary and conclusions 
Our analysis departs from the literature in three dimensions: (a) the concept of the utility, (b) 
social welfare criteria, and (c) method.  
For (a), we adopt a comprehensive notion of utility, in the spirit of the Human Development 
Index, that emphasizes the following three factors in addition to the conventional consumption and 
leisure.  
(i) Education, which modifies the value of leisure time to the individual, besides 
enhancing her productivity; 
(ii) Knowledge, in the form of culture and science, which directly improves the living 
experience, besides raising total factor productivity; and 
(iii) The quality of the environment, which, because of the importance of climate change, 
we interpret as depending on the concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.  
For (b), we consider two criteria. First, Pure Sustainability Optimization, which aims 
maximizing the utility that can be sustained for all generations. Second, Sustainable Growth 
Optimization, where we fix positive rates of growth, with the justification that growth has the 
character of a public good, and maximize the utility of the first generation subject to achieving the 
given, constant rate of utility growth for all subsequent generations. These objectives stand in sharp   38
contrast to the conventional criterion of maximizing the discounted sum of utilities, which we find 
ethically unjustifiable, at least for the discount factors typically used.   
As for (c), our method is inspired by optimization, but, given the current uncertainties in 
climate science, we do not attempt to compute an optimal path for environmental variables: we take 
instead as given a conservative path for the environmental variables, and propose paths for the 
economic variables based on the criteria of Pure Sustainability Optimization and Sustainable Growth 
Optimization. Ideally, for the Pure Sustainability Optimization Program, we would like to approach 
paths where all variables are stationary, whereas for the Sustainable Growth Optimization Program 
we would like to approach balanced-growth paths, where all variables grow at the same rate. But we 
cannot confidently adopt a reasonably simple model of emission-stock interaction. In addition, our 
formulation does not allow the quality of the atmosphere to improve without limit. Accordingly, our 
computations fix emissions and concentrations at levels that allow for stabilization after two 
generations. The resulting dynamic optimization programs defy explicit analytical solutions, and our 
approach has been computational. We have devised computational algorithms inspired by the 
turnpike property for constructing feasible and desirable, although not necessarily optimal, paths in 
the more complex and interesting models. 
  In more detail, we have adopted a simplified path for world emissions and concentrations that 
is based on the more elaborate paths proposed in the IPCC 2007 report aiming at stabilizing the 
concentration of CO2  in the atmosphere at 450 ppm.
25 Our simplified version assumes that we jump 
to a steady state in two generations, after which emissions are maintained at a very low level and the 
concentration of CO2 in the atmosphere is stabilized. We have calibrated our economic model with 
US data, and consider two scenarios for the path of future US CO2 emissions, which imply upper and 
lower bounds on the utility of US representative generational agents. We have then computed 
solutions for the economic variables, by an algorithm that mimics the turnpike method.  
  Our main result is the feasibility of sustaining utility levels higher than the year 2000 
reference value, even when maintaining a positive rate of growth for all successive generations. Not 
surprisingly, higher rates of sustained growth require a lower utility for the first generation, but the 
tradeoff is small, and the first generation reaches a utility higher than the reference value for 
reasonable rates of growth. 
                                                 
25  In our units, 363 GtC above preindustrial levels.   39
  Pure Sustainability Optimization maximizes the utility level sustained for all generations, and 
corresponds to a zero rate of growth. Interestingly, for the scenario of low US emissions its steady 
state consumption is lower than the year-2000 reference consumption level; the increase in utility 
relative to the year-2000 reference value is then due to the increases in the stock of knowledge and in 
the quality of leisure.  
  Achieving this kind of human sustainability under the postulated environmental path requires 
particular kinds of behavior for the economic variables. The most important change is doubling the 
fraction of labor resources devoted to the creation of knowledge, whereas the fractions of labor 
allocated to consumption and leisure are similar to those of the reference year 2000. 
  On the other hand, higher growth rates require substantial increases in the fraction of labor 
devoted to education, together with moderate increases in the fractions of labor devoted to 
knowledge and the investment in physical capital.     40
 APPENDIX 1. CALIBRATIONS 
We interpret that generations live for 25 years. In this appendix, flow variables are typically defined 
as per year averages, and it is understood that stocks are located in the last year of life of a 
generation. The calibrated values that we obtain are reported in Section 2.6 above. 
 
A1.1. Variables  
k
t S  = capital stock available to Generation t (in thousands of dollars per capita). 
n
t S  = stock of knowledge available to Generation t (in thousands of dollars per capita). 
m
t S  = CO2 concentration in the atmosphere above the equilibrium pre-industrial level at the end of 
Generation t’s life (in GtC). 
t x = average annual efficiency units of time (labor and leisure) available to Generation t (in 
efficiency units per capita). 
e
t x   = average annual labor devoted to education by Generation t (in efficiency units per capita). 
c
t x = average annual labor devoted to the production of output by Generation t (efficiency units 
per capita). 
l
t x  = annual average leisure by Generation t (in efficiency units per capita). 
n
t x  = average annual labor devoted to the production of knowledge by Generation t (in efficiency 
units per capita). 
ct = annual average consumption by Generation t (in thousands of dollars per capita). 
it =  average annual investment by Generation t (in thousands of dollars per capita). 
et = average annual U.S. emissions of CO2 from fuel and cement in GtC by Generation t (in GtC). 
 
A1.2. Parameters 
αj  = exponents of the utility function for j ∈ {c (consumption), l (leisure), n (stock of 
knowledge), and m (quality of the biosphere)}. 
k1 = parameter of the production function f
 . 
k2 = parameter of the law of motion of capital. 
k3 = parameter of the law of motion of the stock of knowledge. 
k4 = parameter of the education production function.   41
θj = exponents of the inputs in the production function f for j ∈ {c (labor), k (stock of capital),  
n (stock of knowledge), e (emissions of CO2), m (atmospheric carbon concentration)}. 
δ
k = depreciation rate of the stock of capital (per generation). 
δ
n = depreciation rate of the stock of knowledge (per generation). 
ˆm S  = catastrophic level of carbon concentration in the atmosphere above the equilibrium pre-
industrial level (in GtC). 
ρ =  generational rate of growth of the utility.  
ˆ ρ =  annual rate of growth of the utility (
25 ˆ (1 ) ρ =+ ρ). 
 
A1.3. Functions 
Utility function (utility):  ˆ ,, , ) )() ()( ) ((
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Law of motion of the stock of knowledge:  13 (1 )
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Education production function:  41
e
tt kx x − ≤ . 
 
A1.4. The calibration of the utility function  
We take the exponent of leisure to be twice that of consumption (αl = 2 αc) and calibrate  
αn/αc = 0.05 as the average ratio of expenditure in knowledge (R&D expenditure plus investment in 
computer components and software) over expenditure in consumption during the period 1953-
2000.
26 
Next, we calibrate the ratio αm/αc by the Stern Review (2007) statement that a 5ºC increase in 
the global temperature over the pre-industrial level would imply a health related damage equivalent 
                                                 
26 The data on R&D are derived from Research and Development in Industry, Academic Research and Development 
Expenditures, Federal Funds for Research and Development, and the Survey of Research and Development Funding and 
Performance by Nonprofit Organizations (National Science Foundation, 2003). Data on public investment in software 
are constructed taking the value of public investment in equipment and software (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
2007) and assuming the same share of software in private and public investment.  
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to a 5% loss of global GDP (page x).
27 We can read the statement of the Stern Review as saying that 
a 5% decrease in consumption is equivalent to suffering an atmospheric CO2 concentration of 
m S  , 
yielding 
  ˆˆ ( . 9 5 )()( )( ) ( )()( )( )
αα α α αα α α −= −  cl n m cl n m lnm m lnm m cx S SS cx S SS , 
that is, 
  ˆˆ (.95) ( ) ( )
cm m mm mm SS SS
αα α −= −  . 
Taking logs, 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) (0.95) ln ln . ˆˆ ln
mm mm
cm SS SS α= α − − −   
We take a 5ºC increase in temperature to be associated with CO2 equivalent (CO2e) 
concentrations of 1470 GtC (Stern 2007, Figure 2 in page v). Because we only consider CO2 
emissions (which account for 84% of all GHG) and we compute values above pre-industrial level 




m S =−=   GtC.  
We consider that an increase in temperature of 6º-8ºC (relative to pre-industrial level) would 
have catastrophic impacts.
28 We take this temperature increases to be associated with CO2 equivalent 
concentrations of 750 ppm (or 1597.5 GtC), the lower bound of the studies reported in the Stern 
Review (2007, p.12). As before, adjusting for all gases and subtracting pre-industrial levels, we 
obtain 
1597.5 ˆ 595.5 781.55
1.16
m S =− =. 












Finally, we normalize αc + αl + αm + αn = 1, and obtain the values reported in Table 1 of the 
main text. 
 
                                                 
27 This is also in line with Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) who estimate a total cost (market and non-market) of between 9% 
and 11% of global GDP for a 6ºC warming (as quoted in Stern, 2007, p. 148). 
28 The Stern Review consistently associates catastrophic consequences to temperature increases of 6-8ºC, like, for 
example, sea level rise threatening major world cities (including London, Shanghai, New York, Tokyo and Hong 
Kong), entire regions experiencing major declines in crop yields and high risk of abrupt, large scale shifts in the 
climate system (Figure 2 in page v), and catastrophic major disruptions and large-scale movements of population 
(Table 3.1 in p. 57). 
29 As a reference, the US currently devotes approximately 2% of its gross domestic product to all forms of 
environmental protection.   43
A1.5. The calibration of the production function 
We calibrate the production function  
1 ,,, , () ( ) ) ( ) ( ) ( ) (
e ckn m ckn c k n m
ttt t t t t t t
m
t fxS S S ek x S S e S
θ θθ θθ ≡ , 
in the following inputs: first the more usual labor, physical capital and knowledge, to which we add 
the environmental stock and emissions. We assume constant returns to scale in the first three inputs, 
i. e.,  1 ckn θ+ θ+ θ=. We construct time series for the stocks of physical capital, knowledge, and 
human capital, see sections A3.6-8 below. We take the labor income share to be 2/3, and compute 
the average share of physical capital and knowledge in the total stock of capital for the period 1960-
2000, corresponding to 5/6 and 1/6, respectively. Hence, 2/3 c θ = , k θ = 5/18 and  n θ = 1/18, 
representing the income share of each input. 
We calibrate θe = 0.091 as the “elasticity of output with respect to carbon services” from 
RICE99 in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). 
For the calibration of θm, the elasticity of output to the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere, 
we assume that doubling the CO2 concentration from pre-industrial levels would increase 
temperature by 2.5ºC (Stern, 2007, p.7),
 30 and that a 2.5ºC increase in temperature is associated with 
a 1.5% loss of total GDP (Nordhaus and Boyer, 2000, p.91). Hence, 
 







θ= = = − = −
ΔΔ Δ
 
where y is GDP per capita and T is global temperature. 
We compute  1 k as the TFP of the US economy calibrated to year 2000 values:
31 
 
() () () ( ) ( )
2000
1 ,




0.67 0.28 0.091 0. 06 0075
34.61
16.328
0.3955 73.65 15.64 1.6 177.1
















                                                 
30 The Stern Review asserts that temperature would increase 1.5º-4.5ºC (if we consider feedback effects) and 1ºC as 
direct effects. 
31 GDP is denoted in thousands of constant 2000 dollars per capita. USA emissions are obtained from the World 
Resources Institute (2009). See Section A3.9 below for the values of the other stocks and flows in the year 2000.   44
A1.6. The calibration of the law of motion of the stock of physical capital 
Physical capital investment is equal to private plus public investment less investment in software. 
We take  ˆk δ = 0.06 as the annual rate of depreciation (Thomas Cooley and Edward Prescott, 1995). In 
generational terms, δ
k
 = 0.787. 
To approximate the year-to-year discounting, we take i = average investment in physical 
capital of Generation t per year, and compute that, at the end of Generation t’s life, the accumulated 
investment amounts are 
 
25





k ii i i i
−δ





+ " . 
Thus, since  ˆ 1
k −δ = 0.94, the parameter 
25
2
ˆ 1( 1 )







The time series of the stock of capital is constructed by the perpetual inventory method, using 













25.63 thousands of constant 2000 dollars per capita, where 
k i  
represents total (private and public) investment per capita minus expenditure in software, and g
k  
represents the average yearly growth rate of investment between 1960-1970 (set at 0.038). The value 
for the stock of physical capital in the year 2000 is  2000
k S = 73.65 (in thousands of 2000 dollars per 
capita). 
 
A1.7. The calibration of the law of motion of the stock of knowledge 
The yearly depreciation rate for knowledge commonly used is much lower than the one for capital (e. 
g., the Bank of Spain uses  ˆ 0.15
n δ= , which would mean that knowledge dissipates almost entirely in 
one generation). We believe that the discount factor should be higher because of the 
intergenerational-public-good character of knowledge. A dollar invested in R&D by a firm may well 
generate no returns to the firm 25 years later, yet its impact to the accumulation of social knowledge 
capital may be substantial. Thus, as an approximation we take the depreciation rate of the stock of 




 = 0.787. 
We approximate the year-to-year discounting with the same argument as in physical capital. 
If we denote by i
















.  But, because investment in knowledge is written in efficiency 
units of labor per capita, then 
5
3










, that is, 
2
3


















 is the 
wage of an efficiency unit of labor. 










where (1/3) t x  is the total efficient units of labor and 
n ε the 
share of labor devoted to the production of knowledge. We take 
n ε = 0.05 (5% of total labor) and use 
















49.5 thousands of 2000 dollars.  
Hence, k3 =
25 ˆ 1( 1 )







= 13.118×49.5 = 649.34. 
The time series of the stock of knowledge is constructed by the perpetual inventory method, 













4.21 thousands of constant 2000 dollars per capita, where 
n i  
represents total expenditure per capita in R&D plus public and private investment in software,
32 and 
g
n  represents the average yearly growth rate between 1960-1970. The value for the stock of 
knowledge in the year 2000 is  2000
n S = 15.64 (in thousands of 2000 dollars per capita). 
 
A1.8. The calibration of the education production function 









= , where both the numerator and the denominator are measured in efficiency 


















(for some T),  where  (1 + s) is the growth factor of human capital per generation, and where the 
“hats” represent annual data in hours. Hence, the calibration of k4 is based on two rates: s and the 
                                                 










of time devoted to education out of total time. Note that k4 is increasing in s and 










We take the average yearly growth rate  ˆ s of the human capital stock a value  ˆ s= 0.67% , 
which yields the per-generation factor  (1 + s) = (1 +  ˆ s)
25 = 1.0067
25. This figure, supported by the 
1960-85 average provided by de la Fuente and Domènech (2001), is lower than the 0.93% average 
for 1960-2000 found in Robert Barro and Jong-Wa Lee (2001). 









 is the product of the rate of education in labor and the rate of labor in total time. 
From our time series, we infer that about 10% of total labor is devoted to education, and that labor 
accounts for 1/3 of total time. These figures are conservative in the sense that lower values for them 







== = k .  
 
A1.9. Initial values in the benchmark year 2000 
The values for the stock of physical capital,  2000
k S = 73.65, and knowledge,  2000
n S = 15.64 (in 
thousands of 2000 dollars per capita), are obtained by using the perpetual inventory method as 
reported in sections A1.6-7 above. 
The series of human capital stock (in efficiency units) is constructed normalizing year 1950 
equal to 1 and taking the average yearly growth rate of human capital stock equal to 0.67% (de la 




− =  in 1950-efficiency units, and therefore  2000 x = 
1.0067
50 = 1.396.  
We take education to occupy 10% of labor time. And consequently,  2000
e x = 1.396×1/3×0.1 = 
0.0465 in 1950-efficiency units. 
Finally, see the calibration of the production functions in Section A3.5 above for total 
income, consumption and investment. 
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APPENDIX 2. PROOF OF THEOREM 1: BALANCED GROWTH PATHS IN PROGRAM E 
Table A2.1 illustrates the theorem.  
 


















































































































































































































































Table A2.1.  Stocks and flows in Theorem 1. 
 
Recall that Program E
** [, , ]
m eS ρ of Section 3 above assumes that emissions and concentrations are 
fixed at levels e* and  *
m S , respectively. It can be written as: 
max Λ subject to 







ˆ () ()()( * ) ( 1 ),  f o r   1 ,
() ( )()()( )( ) , 1 ,
()( 1 ) , 1 ,
()( 1 ) , 1 ,
() , 1 .
cl n m









ee n l c
tt t t t t
cx S S S t
yk S e x S S c i t
wS k i S t
nS k x S t
pk x x xx x t





λ− ≥ Λ + ρ ≥
≥+ ≥
−δ + ≥ ≥
−δ + ≥ ≥
≥+++ ≥
 
The Lagrangian multipliers have been written to the left of the constraints.   Our problem is 
to find the condition on the endowment vector (x0
e,S0
k,S0
n) such that the optimal solution to the   48
program is a path of steady growth.    At steady-state growth there will be three different growth 
rates: 
o  the variables  , , , ,
nnecl
ttttt Sxxxx  will grow at a rate g; 
o  the variables St
k,it,ct will grow at a rate γ; 
o  Λtwill grow at a rate ρ. 
From the production function, we must have: 
  (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
ck n gg
θθ θ +γ = + +γ + . 
However, as we have chosen parameters so that 1 kc n −θ= θ+ θ, we have  g γ= , and so there will be 
only two growth rates, namely g and ρ.    From the first constraint, we have (1 ) 1
α+ α+ α += + ρ
cln g ; 
thus a chosen rate g determines ρ.  
Given the ordered triple 
** (, , )
m ge S , there will be a ray 
** 3 (, , )
m ge S + Γ ⊂ℜ  such that if the 
endowment vector 
**
000 (, , ) ( ,, )
enk m x SS g eS ∈Γ , then balanced growth at rates g (and ρ) will occur at 
the optimal solution to the program.  We proceed to determine this ray. 








() ( ) 1 ( 1 ) 0 , 1 ,
( ) ( ) 0, i. e.,  (1/ ) , 1,
(1 )
() ( ) 0 , 1 ,
() ( ) , 1 ,
()
() ( ) 0 , 1 ,
(1 )








∂Λ − λ +ρ = ≥




























bx k p p p k p t
cx p t
x











() ( ) 0 , 1 ,
()
() ( ) ( 1 ) 0 , 1 ,
(1 ) ( )






∂− + − δ = ≥
λαΛ +ρ θ +
∂+ + − δ − = ≥
tt t




nn tn t n t t
tt t nn
tt
gi y k w t
yc i
hS w w t
S
yc i
iS n n t
SS
 
We now substitute into these equations the variable values on a balanced growth path. 
1.  (b) and (c) imply that:   49






























.  This defines  p1 at the solution, and hence  pt.  
























, whereas (e) defines yt ≥ 0, and (g) defines  = 2 / tt wy k . Thus 
all the dual variables are defined and non-negative.    
  This leaves equations (h), (f) and (i) which we now analyze. 
 






















+ θ− − δ
=
θ













tt t t t
kx x x







which, using the balanced growth property of the path means: 
  
21 11















c , we have: 








































6.  Analysis of (i) 






(1 ) (1 )
⎛⎞ αθ −δ






gS gS k k
. 
In sum, we have the three equations (A), (B), and (C).   From the primal constraints we have: 
(D)  10 0 1 1 1 (1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( *) ( *)
nk k n c m e kn cm kg SSxS e c i
θ + θθθ θ θθ += + , 
(E)  04 1 1 1 (( 1 ) )
en c l x kg x x x −+ = + +, 
(F)  21 0()
kk ki S g =+ δ , 
(G)  31 0 ()
nn n kx g S =+ δ . 
























⎛⎞ −δ + δ +














kk pg pg pg
⎛⎞ α −δ
=− + ⎜⎟














kk pg pg pg
⎛⎞ αθ −δ +
=− + ⎜⎟














and  () () ()
1
1 ** * ()









qg e S g qge S
pg pg
θ θ+ θ θ θ
θ+ θ θ+ θ θ+ θ θ+ θ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟ =+ ⋅ ⋅ ⋅
⎜⎟ +
⎝⎠
.   51
  Note that these seven functions are all positive. In particular, it is easily checked that 
() 0
c pg >  for any  0 g ≥ , since  4 1 k > . 
Now from (F) we solve for i: 
   10 ()
ik ip g S = . 
From (G), we have  
   10 ()
nn n x vg S = . 
From (A) and the above expression for i1, we have: 
   10 ()
ck cp g S = . 
  Now view (B) and (C) as a pair of simultaneous linear equations in  11 (,)
cl x x . Solving them 
gives 
    11 0 (,)(( ) ,( ) )
cl c l n x xg g S =ν ν . 
  Substituting these values into (E) gives 
00 ()
nn e Sq g x = . 
 Finally,  we  obtain 
**
00 (, , )
kk m e Sq g e S x =  
by substituting  00 ()
nn e Sq g x =  and   0 () ()
cc n e x gq gx =ν  into equation (D) and solving for  0
k S . 
  Statement (ii) of Theorem 1 is immediately derived from the above equations. Statement (i) 
asserts that the endowments grow along the ray 
** (, , )
m ge S Γ  at rate 1 + g, and statement (iii) says 
that all flow variables exhibit balanced growth.   
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APPENDIX 3.  REACHING THE RAY 
** (, , )
m ge S Γ  IN TWO GENERATIONS FROM DATE-2000 
ENDOWMENTS 
  Table A3.1 illustrates Step 1 in our computation procedure. 
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k S   2000
n S   2000






t = 1 
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k S   1
n S   1






t = 2 
2
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Table A3.1. Step 1 in our computation procedure, where 
** ( , , ), ( ), ( )( , , ), ( )( , ).
kk mnn jj j j qq g e Sqq g vv g j l n c pp g j c i == = = = =  
 
The ray 
** (, , )
m ge S Γ  is defined by  
** 3 ** (, , ) { ( , , ) : (, , ) , () }
me k n k k m e n n e ge S x S S S q ge S x S q gx + Γ= ∈ ℜ = = , 
where the coefficients   and 
nk qq  have been computed in Appendix 2 above. Program G[ 2
e x ] of 
Section 3 above can now be written as follows. 
Program G[ 2
e x ]: Given 
**
11 22 (, , , , , , )
mmm eS eS eS ρ  and  2
e x ,  Max Λ1 subject to   53
11 1 1 1 1
22 2 2 2 1
11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
**
21 2 2
ˆ (A3.1) ( ):( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
ˆ (A3.2) ( ):( ) ( ) ( ( ) ) ( ) (1 ) ,
( A 3 . 3 )() :()( )( )()( ) ,










cxq g xS S
rk x S S e S ci






μ− ≥ + ρ Λ
≥+
222 2 2
10 2 1 1
**
21 2 2 2
10 3 1 1
21 3 2 2
14 01111
))() ( ) ,
(A3.5) ( ):(1 ) ,
(A3.6) ( ):(1 ) ( , , ) ,
(A3.7) ( ):(1 ) ,
(A3.8) ( ):(1 ) ( ) ,






nn n n e
eenlc
xeS c i
zS k i S
zS k i q g e S x
Sk xS
Sk xq g x







24 1 2222 A3.10) ( ): ,
eenlc kx x x x x ζ ≥+++
 
for the year-2000 initial conditions  0 0 0 2000 2000 2000 (, , )( , , )
ekn e k n xSS x S S = .  
This is a concave program, and therefore the first-order conditions will be sufficient. We 
have 10 constraints and hence 10 Lagrangian multipliers, shown to the left of each constraint. There 
are 14 endogenous variables  1 111112222 1 21 1 (, ,,,,,,,,, , ,,)
lcne lcn kn cxxxxcxxxiiS S Λ , and hence 14 Kuhn-
Tucker conditions, as follows. 





c KT c r
c
αΛ






c KT c r
c
α+ ρ Λ




























KT S r z z
S
θ+
∂− + − δ =  
11 1
11 1 1 2
11
()







∂μ + − β + − δ β =  
11 2 4 8:( ) 0;
e KT x k ∂− ζ + ζ =  
11 3 1 9:( ) 0;
n KT x k ∂β − ζ =    54
22 3 2 10:( ) 0;
























∂− ζ =  
11 1 2 13:( ) 0; KT i r z k ∂− +=  
22 2 2 14:( ) 0. KT i r z k ∂− +=  
 







=θ . From KT4 and KT2, 
11 1 1
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==
















      ( a . 2 )  









,          ( b . 1 )  















.          ( b . 3 )  









μ= β                (b.4)   55








μ= β .        ( b . 5 )  











,        ( b . 6 )  










μ+ ρ = μ .        ( b . 7 )  










=μ + ρ ++ ρ μ , 











μ+ ρ += ⎢⎥
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, 
or:      
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.       ( b . 9 )  
  From (b.4) and (b.9),  
14 1 1 1
1





kx k k xx x




i. e.,        
41
1








,          ( b . 1 0 )  
and from (b.5) and (b.8), 
12 1 2
2
32 3 4 1 2 2
(1 ) (1 )





kx k k x x x




i. e.,        
1
2
34 1 2 ()
l




.          ( b . 1 1 )  











,      ( b . 1 2 )  









.      ( b . 1 3 )  
  Finally, from KT2 and (b.9), 
41 1
1










,       ( b . 1 4 )  
















i.e.,       
21
2










.       ( b . 1 5 )  
  From KT13 and (b.14) 
41 1 1
1










,      ( b . 1 6 )  
and from KT14 and (b.15) 
21 2
2










.      ( b . 1 7 )  
  












μ+ − β + − δ β = , 
we obtain 
14 1 1 1 1 4 1 1 41





n nc n l l
lln ll n ll ll
kx c i k kx
kx x S kx x c S k kx x k kx x
αΛ αΛ θ + αΛ αΛ




41 41 1 1 4




n nc n l l
nn
kxkxc i k
Sc S k k
αα θ +α α
+− + − δ = .     (c.1) 












−+ − δ= ,   57
we obtain 
41 1 1 1 41 1 2 1





k ck c c
ll k ll ll
kx c i kx x
kx x c S k kx x c k kx x c
αΛ θ + αΛ αΛ











kx c i kx x
cS kc kc
θ+ −δ
−+ = .        ( c . 2 )  
(d) In summary, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions yield the following four equations involving 
only primal variables, which added to the 10 constraints, written as equalities, constitute a system of 
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n nc n l l
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Sc S k k
αα θ +α α
+− + − δ = ,    (c.1) 
and  







kx c i kx x
cS kc kc
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l .     (e.4) 









= ,     (e.5) 
which substituted into (a.2) yields    58
    
 








e − (1− δ
k)S1
k
k2     (e.6) 
and       
 
c  2 + i2 = αlx2
c q
kx2





l) ,        (e.7) 
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  (f) Inserting (e.3) into (A3.3) we obtain 
10
11 1 1 1 1 1
21 1
(1 )








kx S S e S x
kx x
θθθ θθ −− δ
−α =
α− θ α
          (f.1) 
an equation of the form  11 1 1 1 (,, , )0
cl k n xxSS ϕ= , while inserting (e.7) into (A3.4) yields 
21
12 2 2 2 2 2
22 2
(1 )








kx q x q x e S x
kx x
θθθ θ θ −− δ
−α=
α− θ α
        (f.2) 
an equation of the form  2221 (,, )0 .
cl k xxS ϕ=  
  Inserting (e.4) into (c.1), we obtain 
41 41 1 4
11 1 3 3
(1 ) 0
ll c
n nc n l l l
nn l
cc
kx kx x k
SS x k k
αα θ α α α
+− + − δ =
θα
,  
or:  34 1 34 1 4 1 [1 ] 0
lcn n
cn n lc l kk x kk x k S θα +θ α + θ α − δ − = ,    (f.3) 
a linear equation of the form  3111 (,, )0 .
cl n xxS ϕ=  
  Inserting (e.4), (e.2) and (e.6) into (c.2) yields   59
41 1 41 2





(1 ) (1 )
lc ll k
kl
lk k k lke k k kl
cc cc cc
cl cl
lc c lc c
kx x kx x





θα − −δ θα −− δ θα
α− θ α α− θ α
, 
i. e.,  
41 4 1 1 2 2
11 0 2 1
() ( 1 ) ()
0
(( 1 ) ) ( ( 1 ) )
cc lk c l
kl l cc l cc
k k kk k e kk
cc cc cc
kxk x x x x
SS S q x S
θ α α− θ α − δ α− θ α
−+ =
θα θα − −δ θα − −δ
,   (f.4) 
an equation of the form  411221 (,,,, )0 .
clcl k xxxxS ϕ=  
  Inserting (e.9) into (A3.9), we obtain 
10





el c e SS
xx x k x
k
−− δ
++ + − = ,    (f.5) 
a linear equation of the form  5111 1 (,,, )0







el c e qx S
xx x k x
k
−− δ
++ + − = ,    (f.6) 
a linear equation of the form  62211 (,,, )0
clen xxxS ϕ= . 
  Finally, from (A3.1) and (A3.2), we have 
22 2 2 111 1 ˆˆ ()()( )( ) ( 1 ) ()()( )( )
c l nm c l nm ln em m lnm m cxq xS S cxSS S
αα α α ααα α −= + ρ −. 







[( 1 ) ] ˆ ()( )( )
























− ⎜⎟ α− θ α ⎝⎠
⎛⎞ ⎡⎤ −− δ ⎣⎦ ⎜⎟ =+ ρ −
⎜⎟ α− θ α ⎝⎠
      (f.7) 
an equation of the form  711221 1 (,,,, , )0
clcl k n xxxxSS ϕ= . 
  The seven equations (f.1) to (f.7) form a system in the seven unknowns 
111221 1 (,,,,, , )
clecl k n x xxxxSS . We numerically solve these seven equations using Mathematica, and then 
compute all the other values (including Λ1, which can be obtained from (A3.1)). We check that all 
values and Lagrangian multipliers are non-negative to be assured that we have found a solution. 
 
APPENDIX 4.  UNCERTAINTY 
This appendix refers to results from our companion paper (Llavador et al., 2009) that have a bearing 
on the analysis in this one. We suppose, following the Stern Review, that there is an exogenous   60
probability p that mankind becomes extinct at any generation, and that there is an (independent) 
draw from this random variable at the end of each generation. To model the intergenerational welfare 
objective, we suppose that there is an Ethical Observer (EO) whose preferences satisfy the expected 
utility hypothesis. An outcome (or prize) is the event that mankind lasts exactly T generations, with a 
vector of qualities of life  1 ( ,..., ) T ΛΛ . The EO’s von Neumann-Morgenstern utility at a given 
outcome is denoted  1 ( ,..., )
T
T W ΛΛ . This function, together with the  p(1− p)
t−1exogenous 
probability of extinction at (the end of) date t , define the expected utility of the EO when she 





t(Λ1,...,Λt) .           
A purely Rawlsian EO would only be concerned with the utility of the worst-off person who 
ever lived, and hence her vNM utility at the outcome  1 ( ,..., ) T Λ Λ would be  12 min{ , ,..., } T ΛΛ Λ . 
More generally, we consider the family of vNM utility functions  12 [1 ( 1) ]min{ , ,..., } T T + −β ΛΛ Λ  
parameterized by  [0,1] β∈ , and we call an EO with such a vNM function an extended Rawlsian EO. 
Note that, for  0 β> , such an EO takes into account both the utility of the worst-off generation and 
the future time span T of the human species.
33  
We prove in Llavador et al. (2009) that, for a simpler economy with education and physical 
capital as only intergenerational links, if the discounted-utilitarian program with discount factor 
1 p ϕ= − , diverges, then the solution to the optimization program of the Extended Rawlsian EO 
under uncertainty is exactly the solution to the Pure Sustainability Optimization program.  In 
particular, Λt is constant with respect to t. The EO can then ignore the uncertainty! 
  We conjecture that an analogous result holds for the economy with the constraints of 
Program 
** [, , ]
m Ee S ρ  of Section 3 above. Then, as noted in Section 5.1, if we take 1− p = 0.975  per 
generation of 25 years, then the discounted utilitarian program will diverge with our calibration of 
the parameters.  Therefore we conjecture that the solution to the program of the Extended Rawlsian 
EO is just the solution to the Pure Sustainability Optimization program, for the discount factor 
1 0.975. p ϕ= − =   The very rough intuition is that the possibilities for growth inherent in a large 
value of  4 k  more than counteract the discount on the resources allocated to future generations that 
the EO might contemplate placing, due the possibility that they may not exist, if  4 (1 ) 1 −> pk .    
                                                 
33 We are indebted to Klaus Nehring for suggesting that we extend the pure Rawlsian EO to the “β = 1” case.   61
  However, it must be remarked that a more important kind of uncertainty to introduce would 
be our uncertainty with regard to the physics of global warming.  This is a more difficult 
undertaking.  
 
APPENDIX 5. NORDHAUS’S SOCIAL WELFARE FUNCTION AND THE CALIBRATION OF ITS 
PARAMETERS 
A5.1. A long-lived consumer 
The traditional theory of economic growth considers the accumulation of physical capital, in 
particular the tradeoff between present consumption and the enhanced consumption possibilities of 
future generations offered by saving. It often postulates a long-lived representative consumer, whose 
preferences are representable in an additively separable manner as the discounted sum of future 
single-date subutilities, one for each future date. If only the consumption ct at each date enters the 






, then the consumer’s 
preferences are represented by the utility function  








= −η+ δ ∑  ,       (A5.1) 






), and where the discount factor  
1
1+δ
 (or the 
discount rate δ) reflects the consumer’s marginal rate of intertemporal substitution: a more impatient 
consumer has a larger δ, and attaches little value to a unit of consumption made available to him far 
into the future.   
 
A5.2. Nordhaus’s social welfare function  
The social welfare function in Nordhaus (1991, 1994, 2008a,b), and Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), 
see (2) in Section 5.2 above, is similar to (A5.1), but with a quite different meaning. Now t = 1, 2, 
… represent generations, and ct is the consumption per capita of Generation t.  As noted in Section 
6.1 above, Nordhaus’s (2008a) calls δ and η “central” and “unobserved normative parameters,” 
affecting “the relative importance of the different generations.” The parameter δ is a “pure social 
time discount rate:” a high δ means that the welfare of a generation born far into the future counts 
very little in the social welfare function. The second one represents “the aversion to inequality of   62
different generations.” Informally speaking, if the rates of growth turn out to be negative, then δ 
and η push in opposite directions, a high δ favoring the earlier generations and a high η favoring 
the later, less well off, generations. But for positive rates of growth, when the latter generations are 
better off, high values of either δ or η favor the earlier generations. This is the case in the paths 
proposed by Nordhaus (2008a, b).  
 
A5.3. Nordhaus’s calibration of the parameters 
Nordhaus (2008a,b) calibrates η and  ˆ δ as follows. First, he adopts the “Ramsey equation” 
                         ˆ r  =  ˆ δ  + η ˆ g ,                                     (A5.2) 
where  ˆ r  is the real per year rate of interest on capital and  ˆ g  is the per year rate of growth of 
consumption. Nordhaus (2008a, p. 60-61) justifies equation (A5.2) by the maximization of the 
function (A5.1) subject to some constraints. In his words, and noting that his symbol ρ  (resp. α ) 
corresponds to the δ (resp. η) of the present paper: 
“The basic economics can be described briefly. Assume a time discount rate of ρ 
and a consumption elasticity of α. Next, maximize the social welfare function 
described earlier and in the Appendix with a constant population and a constant 
rate of growth per generation g*. This yields the standard equation for the 
equilibrium real return on capital, r*, given by r* = ρ +αg*.”  
 
Second, he infers  ˆ r  and  ˆ g  from “observed economic outcomes as reflected by interest rates 
and rates of return on capital” (p. 33-34). 
Third, he chooses  ˆ δ  and η subject to the Ramsey equation, which gives one degree of 
freedom. In particular, Nordhaus (2008a, p. 178) takes the values ( ˆ r , ˆ g ) = (0.055,0.02).  Equation 
(A4.2) then holds for any  ˆ (,) δη pair satisfying  ˆ 0.055 0.02 δ =− η , in particular by the values  ˆ (,) δ η = 
(0.015, 2) chosen by Nordhaus (2008a).
34  
Summarizing, equation (A5.2) is obtained by the constrained maximization of (A5.1), 
whereas  ˆ r  and  ˆ g  are deduced from observed behavior. Inserting  ˆ r  and  ˆ g  into (A5.2) could make 
sense if, as in Section A5.1 above, observed behavior was generated by a single long-lived consumer 
who solves the optimization program. But in this case the parameters  ˆ (,) δ η  would be “positive,” 
                                                 
34 Elsewhere in the book he refers to a  ˆ r  of 0.04 (pp. 9-11) and to a  ˆ g  of 0.013 (p. 108).   63
rather than “normative,” whereas Nordhaus’s analysis concerns a world of many distinct generations, 
with parameters  ˆ (,) δη which are “normative.”  It is peculiar to think of rates of return observed in 
the market as depending on these “normative” parameters, in particular on the aversion, by past and 
current market participants, to inequality among generations.  
In addition, because Nordhaus (2008a) gives little detail on the constraints of the optimization 
program leading to (A5.2), it is hard to evaluate the assumption that r* and g* are constant at the 
solution. In any event, the solution paths will depend on the initial conditions on the stocks, so that 
the constancy of rates can typically be justified only asymptotically.
35 
 
                                                 
35  Consider, for instance, the traditional Ramsey problem, with capital but without environmental stocks: An infinitely 






t ct e d t
∞ −η −δ
−η ∫  subject to the law of motion of capital kR and the initial condition 
0 (0) R kk = . Let capital depreciate at the rate δR, and let the production function be 
nt
R Ak e
ψ , where  (0,1) ψ∈ and 
n > 0 is the rate of exogenous technological change. The constraint is then  () () () ()
nt
RR R R kt A kte c t kt
ψ ≤− − δ  . 
Writing the Hamiltonian as H(c, kR, λ) = 
11 (1 ) [ ]
tn t
RR R ce A ke c k
−− η − δ ψ −η +λ − −δ , at the solution path one must 
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t ce











ψ− −λ ψ −δ =λ  . From (a), 
1 .( )
tt cc ec e
−η− −δ −η −δ −η⋅ ⋅ + ⋅− δ = λ   , which together 
with (b),  using (a) again and dividing through by 
t ce
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, a time-dependent 
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11
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0 (0) R kk = requires 
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. But then the parameters 
0 (,, , ,, , ) R An k ηδ ψ δ must belong to the set of measure zero defined by the equality 
11
11





ψ− −ψ = δ +δ+η ψ
−ψ
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